Analysis Of The R&D Game In The Innovation Ecology Of New Energy Vehicles Under The Policy Transition

In recent years,energy crisis and environmental issues have become increasingly prominent.It is of great significance to make clean production and sustainable with low emissions.In this context,new energy vehicle(NEV)industry have become China’s strategic emerging industry.However,due to the characteristics of high investment,high risk and long cycle in the R&D process of NEV technology,the insufficient motivation and investment of R&D restricts the further development of the industry.To this end,the Chinese government has successively proposed a series of support policies to try to solve it.The subsidy policy is one of the important means.Subsidies reduce the production cost of automobile enterprises and expand the market of NEVs in China,but at the same time,they also cause problems such as excessive financial burden and overcapacity of NEVs with low-tech.Faced with this situation,the government has to reduce the subsidies and plan to cancel them in 2020.In order to replace the subsidy policy,the government formulated dual-credit policy by drawing lessons from the experience of automobile fuel economy regulations and NEV management in other countries.At present,it is in the period of policy transition that subsidies gradually reduce and dual-credit policy is fully implemented.Therefore,based on the background of policy transition,it is of practical significance to analyze the influences of different policy stages on the R&D behavior in the NEV innovation ecosystem,and provide suggestions for policy optimization and production management of NEV enterprises.In view of this,based on the game theory,this paper uses the method of backward induction method to discuss the problems of production decision-making and the evolution of R&D strategies in the NEV innovation ecosystem under the policy transition.For the decision-making of R&D production,this part first constructs the decision-making model of R&D production between parts suppliers and manufacturers in the innovation supply chain of NEVs under different policy stages,and the social welfare model of the government.Then,based on the decision-making sequence,the optimal pricing of NEVs,the optimal R&D investment and parts pricing,the optimal subsidy intensity of the government and the score rate of credits are deduced by backward induction method.Finally,the influence of different policy stages on the optimal R&D production decision-making in the NEV innovation ecosystem is analyzed by mathematical derivation and numerical simulation.The results indicate that:The unit pricing of NEV is positively correlated with the subsidy intensity,and the manufacturer has the behavior of increasing the price in disguised form;the incentive effect of subsidies on the R&D investment of suppliers is conditional,which is mainly reflected in the early stage of technology R&D and promotion;the subsidy intensity is not positively correlated with the social welfare,and there is the optimal subsidy intensity to maximize the social welfare;The implementation of the dual-credit policy can effectively reduce the dependence of the supplier’s R&D behavior on government subsidies and improve the supplier’s core technology investment at the same time;balance the relationships between score rate of CAFC of fuel vehicles and the score rate of CAFC of NEVs can help to maximize the social welfare.For the evolution of R&D strategy,this part further constructs a NEV innovation cooperation network R&D game model based on the optimal R&D investment solved by the previous problem.Then,a NEV innovation cooperation network is constructed based on patent data,and the basic topological structure of this network is analyzed by SNA method.Finally,based on the above two works,the complex network simulation method is used to realize the R&D game in the NEV innovation cooperation network within the policy transition.The influence of different policy stages,innovation network environment(network aggregation coefficient,network scale)on the evolution of suppliers’ R&D strategy is analyzed.The results indicate that:The implementation of dual-credit policy can improve the proportion of suppliers’ R&D strategy.When subsidies disappear completely,the in-depth implementation of dual-credit policy can reduce the dependence of suppliers’ R&D decision-making on the subsidy;the evolution depth of suppliers’ R&D strategy in NEV innovation cooperation network can be improved by expanding the scale of innovation cooperation network and determining the optimal network connectivity.