Research On Supply Chain Quality Contract And Incentive Mechanism Considering Cost Structure And Project Duration

With the continuous integration of the global economy,the competition between enterprises is the competition of the supply chain.Therefore,it is important for the buyers to ensure the quality of products in the supply chain meets the requirements with low cost.The focus of this paper is to analyze the cost structure of the supplier,the quality inspection strategy,and the quality inspection incentive mechanism combined with the time limit.First of all,this paper carried out a series of internal research and development of supply chain quality management,and analyzed the characteristics and existing problems of supply chain quality management.Then,based on the introduction of the concept of quality management in the supply chain,this paper specifically studies how to design the contract in the supply chain to ensure that the supplier provides high quality products within a specified period of time and reduces the cost.The principal-agent theory is used to analyze the problem of the optimal quality and capacity in the supply chain without perfect information about the supplier's capacity cost and quality cost.The numerical simulation experiments verify the effect of contract parameters,effective incentives for the quality decision-making behavior of suppliers in the supply chain,and proof that the performance of the supply chain can reach the optimal level.In the next,this paper uses game theory to study two scenarios of centralized supply chain and decentralized supply chain,and the supplier's strategy for quality issues,and specifically analyzes the supplier's product defect rate and inspection efforts.The influence of parameters such as product quality,inspection intensity,and replacement loss are analyzed in numerical simulations.Based on the quality inspection strategy of the supply chain,it analyzes the situation that in the key chain,the entire project duration is delayed due to the quality defects of the supplier and the quality inspection errors of the buyer,resulting in delay costs.The Stackelberg game model and numerical simulations are used to analyze how to formulate the incentive mechanism for suppliers to achieve the balance between quality cost and schedule.The analysis results show that the optimal quality level in the critical chain can be the same as the optimal quality level in the non-critical chain by adjusting the external loss sharing ratio and the unit compensation price.Although the buyer 's profit function in the key chain includes delay costs,the supplier's product quality can be optimized and the supplier's expected revenue can be met by adjusting the unit compensation price and the external loss sharing ratio.