Research On Knowledge Sharing Strategy Selection Of Supply Chain Members Based On Evolutionary Game

In the era of knowledge economy,enterprises can no longer cope with the rapidly changing market environment based on their own knowledge resources.Sharing knowledge with other members of the supply chain has become the main way for enterprises to acquire external knowledge and enhance competitiveness.However,the complexity of the cooperative relationship and the imperfect supervision mechanism reduce the efficiency of knowledge exchange in the supply chain.Therefore,this paper believes that the research on knowledge sharing of supply chain enterprises is of great significance.First of all,this paper summarizes the related theories of supply chain management and knowledge sharing,combining existing research to explain the influencing factors of knowledge sharing from the perspective of subject and object.Then,the evolutionary game model without the restriction of regulatory power is established,and the evolutionary stability strategies of enterprises under different situations are discussed.Based on this,the influence path of parameters on the choice of enterprise is simulated by Matlab.Finally,considering the influence of regulatory power on knowledge sharing of supply chain enterprises,this paper establishes a two-party evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing under the regulatory mechanism and solves the enterprise's stable strategy.On this basis,this paper builds a threeparty evolutionary game model,and discusses the stability strategy of the single agent and the overall game system,analyzing the decision-making process and interaction mechanism of the three parties.Through the analysis of the evolutionary game model of the two parties,it can be concluded that after repeated games,there are two possible stable strategies:(sharing,sharing),(no sharing,no sharing).Knowledge reserves,absorptive capacity,incentive coefficients and penalty coefficients can promote knowledge sharing,while cost coefficients can inhibit knowledge sharing,and as the influencing factors increase in value,their marginal effects on knowledge sharing will be gradually decreases.Through the analysis of the three-party game model of regulatory agencies and enterprises,it can be concluded that the decision-making of either party is affected by the probability of the other two parties participating in knowledge sharing.In addition,for supply chain enterprises,the final decision of knowledge sharing is not only affected by the relationship between shared revenue and non-shared revenue,but also related to the relationship between punishment intensity and cost of sharing.Whether a regulatory agency takes regulatory measures depends on the magnitude of the relationship between the cost of its supervision and the fine it receives.This paper implements the expansion of the traditional dual-subject model,and provides a reference for improving the efficiency of knowledge sharing.The innovation of this paper is to study the evolution of supply chain knowledge sharing from a dynamic perspective.On this basis,Matlab is used to analyze examples,which more intuitively shows the influence path of related factors on enterprise strategy selection.In addition,this paper considers the possible influence of regulators on knowledge sharing,incorporating them as stakeholders,and attempts to construct a three-party evolutionary game model.It enriches the existing research on supply chain knowledge sharing.