| At present,performance-based contract(PBC)has become a new mainstream service contract option between key equipment operators and suppliers.Because of the increasing complexity of equipment technology,operators are gradually outsourcing key equipment maintenance to multiple maintenance service providers,which is becoming the main trend in the field of after-sales service.Multiple suppliers cooperate with each other to complete maintenance according to their own professional advantages Repair task.Some research results show that the cooperative behavior among suppliers has altruistic motivation,that is,multiple suppliers will produce altruistic behavior in cooperative maintenance.Therefore,it is very important for key equipment operators to make multi supplier contracts and encourage different types of suppliers to adopt optimal maintenance capability.At the same time,the cooperative altruistic behavior among multi suppliers should be considered,which will affect their own maintenance ability and supplier contract design.In this paper,two types of PBC contracts(multi contract,team contract)are designed to coordinate and motivate multiple altruistic maintenance service providers,so as to maximize the revenue of operators on the premise of ensuring the output of equipment availability.The specific research work includes:(1)Multi-contract design considering altruistic behavior among suppliers.For multiple independent maintenance service providers with different professional advantages,operators need to sign performance-based contracts with multiple suppliers according to their respective availability output,that is,sign multi contract forms.At this time,altruistic prefers to share some information among suppliers,and they are independent in decision-making.However,altruistic behavior will occur in the process of cooperation,which can help other suppliers to cooperate with them and improve the benefits of all parties.Under the framework of principal-agent theory,we set up the optimal PBC contract,introduce the supplier output model with different technical expertise,and represent the certainty equivalence of the supplier with the altruistic behavior including direct income and indirect income.When key equipment operators sign multiple contracts with multiple suppliers,altruistic behaviors are analyzed,including contract incentives and influencing factors.(2)Team-contract design considering altruistic behavior among suppliers.For multiple maintenance service providers with different professional advantages and close ties,operators need to sign performance-based contracts with the team composed of multiple suppliers according to their overall availability output,i.e.in the form of team contracts.At this time.altruistic prefers complete information sharing among suppliers,and multiple suppliers can be regarded as a whole.At the same time,through the altruistic behavior in the process of cooperation,the benefits of all parties will be improved.Under the framework of principal-agent theory,the optimal PBC contract is set up,the cooperative output model is introduced,and the certainty equivalence of altruistic behavior supplier team is discussed.This paper analyzes the contract incentives and influencing factors of the maintenance capability operators of suppliers when key equipment operators sign team contracts with multiple suppliers.(3)Potential application analysis.Taking GT aircraft engine maintenance as an example.based on the above two contract design models,the optimal PBC design scheme is given,which verifies the feasibility and effectiveness of the above model.At the same time,it analyzes the influence of supplier altruistic behavior on supplier’s own maintenance decision-making and the contract made by operators under different signing forms,and analyzes the influence law of incentive coefficient on suppliers in PBC contract.This paper studies the design of key equipment maintenance outsourcing service contract considering multi supplier altruistic behavior,which provides support and theoretical guidance for the decision-making of practical problems. |