Research On The Deduction Of Bidding Behavior Of Generators Participating In Power Transactions Under Market Environment

In recent years,with the promulgation of the policy to promote the marketization of the power industry,the construction of the pilot electricity market has been accelerated in China.Considering that the setting of market rules is rely on mature experience of European and American electricity markets to some degree,the discussion on the adaptability of the market rules to China’s actual conditions is also increasing.In addition,the development of electricity market has stage goals,so how to cultivate market participants and verify relevant rules under different market maturity has become a problem.In this context,considering the high cost of trial and error in actual operation,simulation under the typical rules and market environment is not only beneficial to the market participants to be familiar with trading process,but also can have feedback to the market rules and provide a more reliable reason for the modification of rules.In this thesis,bidding of power suppliers is taken as the topic to be studied.Considering the inhibitory effect of incentive demand response on the peak electricity price in initial stage of electricity market,a bidding equilibrium model of power suppliers considering the incentive demand response is established to analyze the influence of demand response on bidding strategy.Then take the market maturity in the later stage into account,a bidding equilibrium model with double auctions is put forward to study the strategic biding under the condition of tacit collusion.and its profit result is considered.Suggestions are given to restrain collusion based on the profit results of collusive bidding.The specific work is as follows:(1)A market clearing model considering incentive demand response is established.By analyzing the trigger principle and mechanism of incentive demand response,the demand response of load side is introduced into the bi-level market clearing model,in which the upper model is used to search for the trigger point of demand response and the lower model is the process of market clearing.Through the active load reduction of the user side,the problem of supply shortage and the peak price can be alleviated.(2)A bidding equilibrium model for power suppliers considering the incentive demand response is established.Under the given compensation curve to user side,which is unified by the market operator,the inner particle swarm algorithm is used to search for the individual optimal strategy at the situation where rivals’ strategies are known,and the outer particle swarm algorithm is used to search for the overall equilibrium of all power suppliers.With the iteration process of inner and outer,the bidding equilibrium problem can be solved.And the influence of inhibition on bidding strategies are observed under the different compensation coefficient,market structure and network parameters.(3)The equilibrium model of collusive bidding of power suppliers under the double auctions is established.By establishing a evaluation method which takes comprehensive consideration of both structural and behavioral indicators,this thesis classifies the types of alliance portfolios of power suppliers to simulates their cooperative bidding under different combination modes.On this basis,takes into account the influence of settlement mechanism of CFDS after participating in the market,establishes a cooperative bidding model with financial contracts included.Through the simulation of collusion bidding in different scenarios and the analysis of its profit results,some Suggestions are put forward to restrain collusion in the market.