Research On Employment Strategy And Benefits Of Internet Platforms From The Perspective Of Game Theory

The rapid development of Internet technology has driven the innovation of business models and management methods of enterprises,it has also profoundly affected the changes in enterprise labor relations.Especially in Internet platform enterprises,diversified employment methods and flexible autonomous employment systems have strongly impacted the boundaries of traditional labor relations,triggered a new round of labor-management conflicts and exacerbated the unequal status of both parties.With the extensive use of Internet technology,convenient supervision methods and big data analysis functions have further aggravated this unequal situation,resulting in inharmonious labor relations,difficult identification of platform workers,legality of workers’ rights and interests have not been effectively protected.In addition,Internet platform enterprises occupy a dominant position in ownership management and the remaining distribution rights of cooperation,which also seriously damages the stable state of balanced interests and harmonious relationship between the two.At present,there is no conclusive opinion on the protection of the legitimate labor rights,interests of platform workers,the identification standards and types of identity relationships between Internet platform companies and platform workers,and the employment strategies of Internet platform companies.Most academic circles are also discussing the identification criteria and the type of relationship between the two,and most of the strategic choices of the two sides are based on theoretical analysis.Against this background,article summarizes the viewpoints and types of the relationship between Internet platform companies and platform workers based on the opinions of domestic and foreign scholars,builds a labor-capital game model based on different types of relationships.After researching this article,the following conclusions are obtained:1.Recognition criteria for the relationship between Internet platform enterprises and platform workers: First,look at whether the labor process of this employment relationship is "subordinate labor".Based on this,comprehensively consider the specific performance of the labor process and combine the rights and interests of workers’ comprehensive judgment of oblique protection values is a feasible and rigorous identification method.2.Based on this criterion,it is found that there are labor relations,labor service cooperation relations and economic cooperation relations between Internet platform enterprises and platform workers.3.Regardless of the relationship of the game,the final game results are different under different prerequisites,and their evolution paths are also different.The inference based on this conclusion is 1)When Internet platform companies prevent employee moral hazard behaviors,introducing a government supervision system is an effective way,which can also effectively conduct unethical behaviors of enterprises supervision.2)Regardless of whether the government controls the cost of supervision,as long as the government’s regulatory revenue is increased moderately,the probability of non-cooperation of the capital can be reduced to varying degrees;3)As the probability of government supervision rises,the probability of capital investment and normal operation increases.That is,the greater the government’s supervision,the lower the probability of illegal operation by the management;4)The management will increase investment when choosing the principle of the supremacy of interests,but it will rise as the government’s supervision probability rises.This proves that in the case where the employers ignore the interests of labor and conduct illegal capital operations,the investment strength of the employers has a proportional relationship with the degree of government supervision.5)Non-cooperation damages the management’s performance improvement,and the loss of labor’s own reputation far exceeds the profit obtained by betraying the other party.