| With aging population and changes in family structures and elderly care views,the function of traditional family care is being weakened and the elderly care service is transformed into market and society-oriented public service.The “supporting role” of private participation in elderly care services is more and more important.Although the government has issued policy documents and invested subsidies to promote the development of smart aging platform services,the contradiction between supply and demand of aging services is still prominent.Considering subsidy efficiency,this study analyzes the impact of government subsidies on elderly’s demand behavior and the private supply strategy.Based on the status of smart aging platforms,this study applies the game theory to analyze the private supply strategies under competition effects,demand effects,and subsidy effects.The impact of government subsidies on supply strategies is explored.The elderly’s choice behavior is investigated by the discrete choice model and the utility functions of the elderly with and without self-care ability are developed.Based on the supply-demand analysis,the smart aging platform with private participation is regarded as a complex system which is further deconstructed by multi-agent simulation.Agent attributes and behavior rules of the demand subsystem and the service subsystem are clarified.Different subsidy strategies and measurement index of subsidy efficiency are identified.The subsidy efficiency simulation model is then built on Netlogo.Finally,Nanjing is used as an example to examine supply-demand levels,market shares,private profits,and government subsidy expenditures under different subsidy strategies.Based on the simulation results,suggestions and implications regarding subsidy policies are provided.This study finds that the increase of government subsidies to the private sector directly induces the smart institution-based aging service provision and the impact on the smart community-based aging service provision depends on the price sensitivity of smart institution-based aging services.In terms of subsidies for smart institution-based aging service,subsidy efficiency of government-to-the-private is better than that government-to-the-elderly.Subsidy efficiency of smart community-based aging service depends on the government subsidy threshold.Differentiated smart community-based aging service subsidies to the elderly is conducive to improving government subsidy efficiency.This study also finds that: the elderly’s price sensitivity to smart aging platform services,the substitution elasticity of two smart aging platform services,and the learning rate index of the technology investment cost of smart aging platform services affect the government subsidies efficiency.This paper explores the impact of differentiated government subsidies on the private and the elderly’s behavior in smart aging platform services,and provides theoretical suggestions for the government to improve the subsidy efficiency. |
