Research On Moral Hazard Of Internet Insurance Policyholders

In recent years,with the increase in the popularity of the Internet and the strengthening of public insurance awareness,the Internet insurance market has shown rapid growth.Compared with traditional insurance,Internet insurance has advantages in convenient insurance application,short underwriting cycle and paperless settlement of claims,which not only bring new opportunities,but trigger new risks,especially moral hazard.According to the International Association of Insurance Regulators,about 20%-30% of global insurance claims are suspected of fraud each year.This article also calculates the comprehensive payout ratios of the four professional internet insurance companies from 2016 to 2018,and finds that with the sharp increase in the scale of premiums,the comprehensive payout ratios have also shown an overall upward trend in recent years.Presumably,the compensations caused by moral hazard behaviors such as psychological negligence of the policyholder and deliberate deception and insurance compensation are not uncommon.Internet insurance companies cannot adopt the same risk control model as traditional insurance companies because of its different sales models and risk formation mechanisms.According to the characteristics of Internet insurance,it is of great significance to establish a targeted moral hazard prevention system of policyholders.This article takes the moral hazard of Internet insurance policyholders as the research direction,uses insurance principle,insurance law,contract law,criminal law and other relevant professional theoretical knowledge,and adopts literature analysis,comparative analysis,case analysis and empirical analysis research methods to analyze the factors influencing moral hazard of policyholders and propose the measures to prevent the moral hazard of the Internet insurance policyholders based on the results of the empirical analysis.The research ideas of this paper are as follows.Firstly,starting from the theoretical analysis,this paper combs out the unique forms of moral hazard of the policyholders in the Internet insurance from the underwriting and claim settlement process and explains them with cases.For example,because it is difficult for the insurance company to confirm insurance will of the insured in the process of Internet insurance underwriting,it will easily lead to the moral hazard of the insured once the insurable interest changes.The convenience of online insurance application also easily triggers malicious insurance,fraudulent insurance and multiple insurance claims.After that,based on the theory of planned behavior,this paper constructs an empirical model of the moral hazard behavior intention of policyholders to analyze the factors affecting the moral hazard of the policyholders.We collected two groups of data of Internet insurance and traditional insurance through questionnaire survey.A comparative study of the two groups of sample data reveals that compared with traditional insurance policyholders,Internet insurance policyholders have higher moral hazard,higher degree of recognition of moral hazard behaviors,higher confidence in the successful implementation of moral hazard behaviors and lower perception of risk.This paper uses the structural equation model to study the influencing factors and finds that behavior attitude(means the attitude of the policyholders to the moral hazard behavior),perceived behavior control(means the difficulty of the implementation of the moral hazard behavior),subjective norms(means the influence of others on their own behavior intention),perceived risk(means the perception of the risk of behavior consequences),legal and policy regulation and the lack of insurance cognition of insurance guarantee function significantly affects the moral hazard of the policyholders.And the subjective norms affects the moral hazard behavior intention by the behavior attitude,the legal policy factors affects the moral hazard behavior intention by perceived risk.Finally,based on a comparative analysis of the impact of various influencing factors on the moral hazard of Internet insurance and traditional insurance policyholders,this paper puts forward some suggestions to prevent the moral hazard of Internet insurance policyholders from three factors(behavior attitude,perceived behavior control,legal and policy regulation)that have the greatest impact on the moral hazard of Internet insurance policyholders.Compared with the previous studies,the innovation of this paper is mainly reflected in the following three aspects.Firstly,this article starts with the differences in business processes and refines the moral hazard of Internet insurance policyholders.Internet insurance sales model takes the Internet of computers and e-commerce as the medium,which is essentially different from the traditional insurance agent marketing model.Due to the change of business model,there are essential differences in moral hazard of policyholders.In the existing studies,scholars at home and abroad have done a lot of research on the risk of insurance companies,but most of them are focused on the risk of traditional insurance.Compared with other studies,the innovation lies in that the topic of this paper,which focus on Internet insurance moral hazard and its prevention,is rarely studied.Secondly,this article attempts to use empirical method to prove the existence of moral hazard in Internet insurance.This paper uses statistical method to test the collected questionnaire data,and proves that the level of moral hazard of policyholders in Internet insurance is higher than that in traditional insurance.Thirdly,most of the previous empirical studies are about the existence of moral hazard,but no empirical studies about influence mechanism.This paper constructs an empirical analysis model of the influencing factors of the moral hazard of the policyholders,and uses the structural equation model to find out the factors that have a significant impact on the moral hazard behavior of the policyholders and finally proposes targeted measures to prevent the moral hazard of the Internet policyholders based on the empirical research.