Research On Safety Supervision Mechanism Of Construction Project From The Perspective Of Multi-Party Game

The construction process of the project involves many stakeholders,the cycle is long,and it is easy to cause safety accidents.The frequent occurrence of accidents reflects the difficulties in the construction of a safety supervision system.As the direct participants of the engineering project,the contractor and the supervising engineer are not to blame.But as the supervisors of engineering projects,the government and owners also have inescapable responsibilities.In order to ensure the safety of engineering projects,it is necessary to establish an effective supervision mechanism.However,in the past,scholars mostly used traditional game methods,which did not consider the dynamic characteristics of the game process,and mostly used two-party game models.security impact.Based on this,this thesis uses principal-agent theory and evolutionary game theory,considers the collusion behavior of supervisors and contractors,establishes a multi-level principal-agent model and a multiparty evolutionary game model,and analyzes the optimal behavior selection and behavior interaction mechanism of major stakeholders and their impact on evolution.Stability factors,and use matlab2021 a for simulation analysis.The research conclusions of this thesis can provide theoretical support and strategic suggestions for the government and owners to provide an effective supervision mechanism,and have important guiding significance for improving the effectiveness of safety supervision,reducing the accident rate of engineering projects,and improving the level of safety management.This thesis first introduces the relevant background of the research on the safety supervision of engineering projects,and sorts out the relevant literature on the research on the safety supervision of engineering projects;The relevant main research theories are discussed;thirdly,the rights and responsibilities of the main participants in the safety supervision of engineering projects are analyzed,and the government supervision chain of safety supervision is constructed;then,a multi-layer principal-agent model is constructed according to the principal-agent relationship,and the optimal government is discussed.The supervision intensity,the optimal supervision intensity of the owner and the optimal incentive compensation set,the optimal safety input of the contractor and the optimal labor input of the supervisor,and simulate the relationship between the key elements according to the model results;Finally,a multi-party evolutionary game model of government-ownersupervision engineer-contractor is constructed,focusing on how to improve the government’s supervision efficiency,how to prevent the collusion between the contractor and the supervisor and improve the probability of strong supervision,and how to improve the contractor’s adoption of "" The probability of non-opportunistic” behavior.Through the research,it is found that the degree of collusion between the supervisor and the contractor is affected by the government,the owner’s supervision intensity and the punishment intensity.Higher regulatory intensity and greater penalties by the government and owners will inhibit collusion between the supervisor and the contractor;the owner and the government’s supervision intensity have a mutual influence relationship;the government and the owner’s own supervision costs will also affect their own supervision intensity.Higher regulatory costs will reduce regulatory enthusiasm to some extent.Therefore,the government should use modern network computing and innovate supervision technology to reduce its own supervision cost coefficient as much as possible,such as using remote monitoring,security early warning system and so on.In addition,the government can urge contractors and supervisors to perform their duties by increasing the collusion costs of contractors,increasing the losses of contractors and supervisors after accidents,such as expanding media disclosure and improving the professionalism of contractors and supervisors.In addition,the government needs to strengthen the supervision for the supervision with higher profits from collusion,and at the same time,it can appropriately reduce the cost of supervision and strong supervision,and improve its supervision enthusiasm.