Research On The Evolutionary Game Of Vertical Collusion In Tendering For Construction Projects

The issuance of the Bidding and Tendering Law of the People’s Republic of China indicates that the bidding system has entered China’s construction industry in a legal way,but collusion in the bidding and tendering market is still common,causing serious harm to the healthy development of the construction industry.The collusion violated the relevant regulations on bidding,undermined the principle of "honesty and credit" in the market economy,caused imperfect competition in construction market transactions,and caused losses to public interests.Therefore,it is necessary to study the internal causes and behavior mechanism of collusion,so as to make contributions to promoting the completely fair competition in the construction trading market and the full role of China’s bidding and bidding system in construction projectsThis paper studies the collusion between bidders and bidding agencies in the bidding process of construction projects under the supervision of governmental supervisory departments,synthesizes the investigation results of domestic and foreign scholars,and constructs a research framework for the supervision of collusion among governmental supervisory departments,bidding agencies and bidders.Firstly,the causes of collusion in bidding for construction projects are derived based on existing domestic and foreign literature and expert consultation method,and the main causes of collusion between them are identified based on the hierarchical analysis method.Then,build the three-party group evolution game model,and find the game equilibrium point,and then build the dynamic evolution of the main game and simulation.Finally,the strategy analysis is carried out based on the simulation results,and relevant countermeasures and suggestions are provided to government regulators,bidding agencies and bidders respectively.Research results show that:(1)Among the causes of vertical collusion in bidding for construction projects,the eight causes of collusion cost A11,risk preference of bidding subjects A13,supply and demand imbalance A21,competition pressure A14,supervision A42,information asymmetry A23,degree of punishment loss A12 and prequalification of the tenderer A31 accounted for 81%.(2)Under the premise of the evolutionary game model analysis of the three subjects in the construction project bidding,the collusive behavior governance produces two results: one is "ineffective governance",when the collusive strategy is the optimal strategy choice for the bidding agency and the bidder,regardless of whether the government regulatory department chooses the regulatory strategy or not.The second is "effective governance",which means that the collusion strategy of the bidding agency and the bidder will be adjusted appropriately with the change of the regulatory strategy of the governmental supervisory authority,and the game system of the three parties is in a dynamic game state.(3)A strategic simulation of the system dynamics model was conducted to examine the effects of different initial behavioral states of the tripartite subjects and changes in key parameters such as regulatory success probability,regulatory cost,penalty coefficient and reputation loss on the decision-making behavior of different subjects.(4)Provide relevant countermeasures and suggestions to government regulatory departments,bidding agencies and bidders respectively.This paper’s research on the regulation of vertical collusion among three parties in bidding broadens the ideas of construction project collusion research,and at the same time provides a reference for governmental supervisory departments to regulate bidding activities and curb vertical collusion.