Modeling And Simulation Analysis Of Cooperative Evolution Considering Environmental Factors And Individual Psychology

There is a wide range of cooperation in nature from the microbial group to complex human society,which contradicts the theory of Darwin.In the fierce competition between individuals,self-private behavior will receive a higher return,so how can natural selection produce cooperation? Understanding the evolution of cooperation between selfish individuals in human and animal societies is a major challenge for countless disciplines.For decades,the reasons for cooperation have confused researchers in various fields.Evolutionary game theory is often used as a framework to explain the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior.In fact,networks can effectively describe the relationships between individuals in a group.In recent years,the combination of complex networks and evolutionary game theory is a new research direction.There are some classic game models,such as prisoner’s dilemma,snowdrift game,public goods game and scissors,stone and cloth game.And there are also some basic complex network structures here,such as regular grids,small-world networks,random networks,and scale-free networks.First of all,in order to deal with the problem of corporate pollution control,we construct an evolutionary game model between the masses and pollution-producing enterprises,and dynamically simulates their strategy selection by using the relevant theory of replication dynamic equation.The analysis results show that it is necessary to improve the enthusiasm of public supervision,increase the subsidies for enterprises to actively control pollution,and increase the punishment of illegal enterprises to effectively rectify the pollution control work of enterprises.Secondly,in the prisoner’s dilemma game,the evolution of cooperation based on social preference on a two-dimensional regular grid is studied.On the basis of the calculation of fitness considering environmental factors,the payoff of neighbors with the same agent strategy and neighbors with different agent strategy is distributed through social preference the final fitness is calculated,and the strategy is updated according to the fitness.Through the simulation experiment,it is concluded that the cooperation can be effectively promoted by increasing the proportion of the payoff of the same strategy.However,in special situation,the fitness of defectors is higher than the fitness of cooperators.At this time,increasing the degree of social preference will reduce the proportion of cooperation.Finally,the degree of prudence is introduced into the evolutionary game,and it is believed that individuals will participate in the game behavior more cautiously.In the game process,after knowing the payoff of the surrounding neighbors,the individual’s imitation psychology changes accordingly with the payoff of the neighbors.The parameter A controlling the intensity of caution is proposed here,which is used for reassessing the payoff of the imitation object according to the payoff of the neighbors when updating the strategy.The snowdrift game is used to conduct research: It is found that when the value of r(parameter of the game matrix)is small,increasing the value of A can restrain cooperation.When the value of r is greater than 0.3,increasing the value of A can effectively promote the cooperation of the whole group.The situation is different in the prisoner’s dilemma game.For all temptations,increasing the value of A can promote cooperation.