Font Size: a A A

Research On The Behavior Supervision Of Live Broadcasting Assisting Farmers Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

Posted on:2024-06-05Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:W Z YuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2530306929495674Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the promotion of the national rural revitalization policy,the live broadcast agricultural assistance industry has gradually become one of the important ways of poverty alleviation and agricultural assistance.The direct seeding agricultural assistance model has driven the sales of agricultural products and helped farmers increase their income.However,problems such as anchor speculation,lack of platform supervision,and quality of agricultural products have become increasingly prominent during the development of direct seeding to assist agriculture,which have seriously damaged the rights and interests of farmers and consumers,violated the original intention of direct seeding to assist agriculture,and in the long run,restricted the development of the direct seeding to assist agriculture industry.Therefore,how to effectively supervise the direct seeding agricultural aid market based on the live seeding platform and the government,and promote the sustainable development of the direct seeding agricultural aid model has become an urgent issue to be solved.Based on market failure theory,government regulation theory,and evolutionary game theory,this article first explores the game relationship between the autonomy of live streaming platforms and the behavioral strategy choices of anchors and farmers.Through stability analysis,it is concluded that there is a lack of platform regulation in the agricultural live streaming market under the spontaneous regulation of the market,this has brought about improper behavior of anchors and poor quality of agricultural products.Based on this,we introduce government regulation and analyze the impact of government strategies on platform regulatory behavior by constructing an evolutionary game model of government intervention in the regulation of live streaming and agricultural assistance.And use Matlab software to simulate and analyze relevant parameters to explore the supervision and incentive effects of government regulatory mechanisms on the live broadcast agricultural assistance industry.The research finds that under the spontaneous market regulation mechanism,the platform can effectively reduce the negative behavior of anchors by increasing the rewards and punishments for anchors;When consumer groups find that the probability of violations of agricultural live streaming is low,the additional benefits of negative agricultural assistance by anchors are high,and the impact of reputation mechanisms is small,there is a lack of platform supervision,and the market’s spontaneous regulatory mechanism fails.After the government’s intervention,the regulatory choice of live streaming platforms is not only driven by the trend of economic benefits,but also constrained by external regulation.The increase in the frequency of government regulation or the loss of reputation have a positive incentive effect on the platform’s selection of regulatory strategies.Consumers have found that the increase in the probability of assisting farmers with live streaming can,to a certain extent,supplement the government’s constraints on the platform.Moderate government incentives and subsidies for the platform and farmers can promote active supervision of the platform and high-quality production by farmers,but low subsidies are not conducive to stimulating their enthusiasm;In the long run,excessive subsidies increase the burden on the government,which will reduce the regulatory enthusiasm of regulators.The increase in social welfare,the loss of reputation of regulatory authorities,or the strengthening of accountability and punishment by higher authorities will all promote the implementation of strict regulatory strategies by government regulatory authorities.Therefore,in order to promote the sustainable development of the direct seeding agricultural aid model and make contributions to poverty alleviation,the platform should improve the credit mechanism of the direct seeding agricultural aid market and strengthen the penalty for breach of contract,so as to restrict the active assistance of anchors to agriculture.Government departments can promote active supervision and high-quality production by farmers through subsidies and punitive measures to maintain market order.In addition,enhancing consumer supervision awareness and unblocking consumer rights protection channels can indirectly constrain the orderly development of the live streaming commercial industry.
Keywords/Search Tags:Live broadcast to help farmers, Supervision of subject behavior, Evolutionary game, Simulation analysis
PDF Full Text Request
Related items