Research On Enterprise Carbon Reduction Strategies Based On Evolutionary Game Theory

With the rapid development of China’s economy and the acceleration of carbon emissions,China has become the world’s largest carbon emitter and is facing severe pressure to reduce emissions.And putting forward the goals of "carbon reaching peak" and "carbon neutralization" is a strategic decision made actively by our country.We are required to speed up the construction of the national carbon emission right market and accelerate the construction of the green economic system.However,Chinese carbon trading market is still in its infancy,and problems such as too low trading volume and inactivity in the market make it difficult for enterprises to achieve emission reduction targets by market means.In view of this,this paper adopts the evolutionary game theory to build the dynamic evolutionary game model of the government,enterprises and the public and the game model among enterprises based on the carbon emission trading system,which provides management enlightenment for promoting enterprise emission reduction and promoting sustainable economic development,which has certain theoretical and practical significance.The main research contents are as follows:Firstly,the relationship between game players in the carbon trading market is sorted out,a three-party evolutionary game model including the government,enterprises and the public is constructed,the replication dynamic equation of the three is obtained,and the stability of each equilibrium point is analyzed according to the Jacobian matrix,and then the evolutionary path is simulated.Analyze the influence of carbon price and emission reduction cost on enterprises’ emission reduction behavior,and put forward corresponding policy suggestions to improve the effectiveness of government supervision and enterprises’ enthusiasm for emission reduction.On this basis,taking enterprises under government regulation and public role as research objects,this paper analyzes the evolutionary game model between enterprises,studies the impact of carbon trading price fluctuations and changes in joint emission reduction costs on enterprises’ emission reduction decisions,and explores how enterprises change their own strategies and actively participate in carbon emission trading to realize their own interests under the background of implementing carbon emission trading policies.Get long-term development.The findings of this study are as follows: first,the behavioral decisions among subjects affect each other and depend on each other,among which the government’s subsidies and penalties,carbon quota price and other factors play a key role in the behavioral decisions of the government,enterprises and the public;Secondly,enterprises’ emission reduction costs and benefits are important factors affecting enterprises’ emission reduction.Reducing emission reduction costs and improving emission reduction benefits can effectively guide enterprises to consciously reduce emissions.Third,government supervision plays an important role in promoting enterprises’ emission reduction.Government supervision on enterprises can effectively increase the probability of enterprises’ emission reduction.Fourth,public participation can promote enterprises to reduce emissions;Fifth,the development of carbon trading market can optimize the emission reduction path,and form a good situation of voluntary emission reduction of enterprises through market means.