Study On Farmland Transfer Collusion Game From Multidimensional Preference Perspective

Agricultural land has not only property value for farmers,but also survival security value.Any break of value chain in the circulation of agricultural land may lead to farmers forming organizational resistance,thus restricting the realization of rural harmony.The emergence of collusive groups in the circulation of agricultural land has suppressed the resistance of farmers,led to the growing group of profiteers and the devaluation of farmers’ assets,exacerbated the social gap between rich and poor,and brought unstable factors to the construction of a happy countryside.Based on this practical background,this paper intends to explore the game action mechanism of the related parties of rural land circulation in the case of collusion from the perspective of multi-dimensional preferences of micro individuals of rural land circulation,in order to propose an effective collusion governance mechanism,so as to provide reference for promoting effective governance of rural land circulation.First of all,the research on the behavior game of rural land circulation,the collusion game of rural land circulation and the governance mechanism of rural land circulation are reviewed.The collusion theory,the behavior preference theory and the rent-seeking game theory together lay a theoretical foundation for the research.Then,based on the analysis of preference characteristics,the model hypothesis is proposed.The initial circulation collusion game model and the long-term circulation collusion game model are respectively constructed.The equilibrium solution of collusion game under different behavior preference combinations is discussed.The analysis results are presented by numerical simulation.And the formation mechanism of collusion problem is summarized.Finally,through case analysis,the results of game analysis are applied,and the governance path of collusion in rural land transfer is proposed.The research shows that the collusion problem of rural land transfer has its institutional,economic and social roots.From the perspective of self-interest and loss aversion preference,tournament system,imperfect supervision and punishment mechanism,and blocked channels for farmers’ rights protection are the institutional roots of collusion,while high income and low risk are the economic roots of collusion.Based on the perspective of mutual altruism and mutual fairness preference,the weak relationship between reciprocity and fairness is the social root of collusion,among which the institutional root and social root are the deeper reasons.We should improve the supervision system of rural land transfer,strengthen the restraint of punishment system,and reshape the reciprocal and fair relationship between the subjects of rural land transfer.