Game Analysis Of Government Incentive Strategies For Prefabricated Construction Building Based On System Dynamics

The promotion and application of prefabricated construction building can effectively alleviate the contradiction between economic growth and resources and environment.Under the new normal,the downward pressure of China's economic growth becomes greater,promoting the transformation and upgrading of the construction industry has far-reaching significance for the sustainable development of economy and society.At this stage,the domestic prefabricated construction building market is still in the early stage of development,and government incentive policies are a key link to guide and promote its development.Since 2016,although the central government has successively introduced a series of prefabricated construction building incentive policies,the lack of endogenous motivation in the market and the low degree of preference on the supply side and the demand side have severely restricted the development speed of prefabricated construction building.In this thesis evolutionary game theory is introduced to start from the behaviors of relevant stakeholders in prefabricated construction building market.Firstly,the government-developer and government-consumer evolutionary game model are constructed,and the equilibrium point of the game system is solved by the replicated dynamic equation.The analysis of local stability of the equilibrium point of the game is based on Jacobian matrix method,so as to find out the factors that affect the equilibrium of the game.Secondly,on the basis of the two-party game,a tripartite evolutionary game model of government-developer-consumer is constructed and analyzed,and the evolution strategy and equilibrium stability of each subject in the same system are qualitatively studied.Finally,the system dynamics model is drawn according to the logical relationship provided by the tripartite evolutionary game model.Through the reasonable assignment of parameters,with the help of Vensim software,the quantitative analysis of the evolution of pure strategy state and mixed strategy state is carried out to study the evolution path of the behavior of government,developers,and consumers.In the mixed strategy analysis,the influence of different intensity of supervision,penalty amount and financial subsidy amount on the choice of tripartite evolution strategy is discussed.The research shows that:In the initial state,when the acceptance of prefabricated construction building is low at the supply and demand side,only relying on incentive policies cannot effectively promote the development of prefabricated construction building market;the increase in government economic incentives directly promotes the transformation of developers and the introduction of reasonable punishment and supervision mechanisms in the industry has a greater role in promoting high-quality development of the industry and higher efficiency;the growth of the demand side has an obvious effect on increasing the endogenous development momentum of prefabricated construction building market and achieving independent development.The incentive process of prefabricated construction building involves multi-party interest game,in the process of formulating incentive policies,the government should promptly adjust the strategy according to the market environment to improve the pertinence and effectiveness of the policy,and accelerate the development of the prefabricated construction building market from the two aspects of supply and demand.