Study On The Optimization Of The Regulatory Mechanism Of Platform-based E-Commerce Market Based On Evolutionary Game System Dynamics

The maturation of internet technology and the popularization of smartphones have provided the organizational carrier and technical support for the development of e-commerce.Combined with strong market demand and a lax national policy environment,providing an important guarantee for the rapid development of China’s e-commerce,making it experience more than 20 years of rapid development and has become a new impetus for China’s economic development.However,in the process of promoting China’s economic development,the e-commerce market has also emerged many problems such as malicious consumer rights protection,fake sales by platform sellers,breach of faith by platform enterprises and inefficient supervision by market supervision authorities.These problems not only hinder the construction of the social integrity system,but also damage the influence of the platform and the credibility of the government,and seriously increase the difficulty of e-commerce regulation and governance.At present,the multi-subject supervision mode is gradually forming in China’s e-commerce market,but because of the large bilateral market of platform and the immaturity of our country’s market supervision mechanism,the supervision problem of e-commerce market has not been solved effectively.Therefore,it is of great practical significance to explore the optimal way of supervision mechanism in order to improve the design of supervision mechanism and make the market run more smoothly and efficiently,in order to safeguard the social and economic welfare of our residents and promote the high-quality development of platform economy.Under the premise of considering the complexity,systematization and dynamics of the regulation of the e-commerce market,the main relevant subjects of the regulation of the e-commerce market,"government regulatory authorities,platform enterprises,merchants and consumers",are placed in the unified regulatory system to construct the evolutionary game model of the ecommerce regulatory system,and the regulatory mechanism is optimized by combining the theory of evolution game with the system dynamics simulation tools,using numerical simulation analysis to study the regulatory status of ecommerce platforms and the future evolution path.In the end,the following conclusions were reached:(1)There are 16 pure strategic equilibrium points in the evolution game of the platform-based e-commerce regulatory system,of which there are 6 conditional equilibrium points and the remaining pure strategic equilibrium points are unstable.However,under the balanced conditions of the six stable points,the market is still full of all kinds of speculative behaviors,and the market has failed to achieve self-regulatory development.(2)Conventional methods to improve regulatory efficiency by increasing penalties can restrain speculative behavior in the market and improve the efficiency of the regulatory system in the long run,but this method will lead to volatility and shock in the regulatory system in the short and medium term,make it more difficult to implement regulatory policies,and is not conducive to the regulation and orderly development of the market.(3)Under the dynamic penalty model,the rate of violation of the target and the value of the penalty are positively correlated,which can improve the stability of the whole system and provide a stable environment for the implementation of regulatory policies.(4)Designing a hierarchical model of additional rewards and penalties on top of the dynamic penalty model:the government gives the platform the power to impose additional rewards and penalties on sellers,forming a regulatory hierarchy in which the government is in charge of the platform and the platform is in charge of the sellers,and then imposing additional rewards according to the cost of the regulated person performing his duties and the likelihood of his speculative behavior being regulated,and additional penalties according to his excess revenue from violations and the likelihood of his violations being regulated.It can increase the positive behavior return and negative behavior punishment,improve the accuracy and dynamics of rewards and penalties,increase the incentive for regulators to implement positive behavior,promote healthy market development,and achieve a regulated,orderly and efficient development of the market in a short period of time.Under the new regulatory mechanism,the self-evolution of the market and government supervision can form a benign interaction,and ultimately achieve the research goal of selfregulation of the platform e-commerce market,forming a new market supervision pattern of coordinated supervision by the government,self-regulation of the industry and active and positive supervision by society.