Research On Pricing Decision Of Low Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain For Government Regulation Of False Reporting

In recent years,the penetration rate of the Internet has continued to increase,Internet technology has continued to improve,the e-commerce industry has developed rapidly,and market competition has been described as fierce.At the same time,with the rapid development of the economy and the gradual improvement of consumers’ awareness of green consumption,higher requirements have been put forward for the sustainable development of the economy.Carbon trading policies have emerged as the times require.Enterprises are the main body of carbon emissions.The green upgrade of enterprise products puts forward higher requirements and greater challenges.In the face of fierce market competition and higher requirements for enterprises from carbon trading policies,in order to obtain more profits,enterprises take advantage of cost information asymmetry to falsely report carbon information,such as carbon innovation quality information and initial carbon emission costs.information.The carbon information false reporting behavior of enterprises will have a huge impact on the decision-making of supply chain members and the whole.The impact of social welfare is particularly important.At the same time,the government’s countermeasures against companies’ false reports will also be extremely important.Combined with the above analysis,based on the characteristics of the current market operation,the article constructs a secondary e-commerce supply chain composed of manufacturers and e-commerce platforms,with the e-commerce platform as the dominant model,considering the fact that manufacturers falsely report carbon innovation quality information and initial carbon emissions Cost information,using Stackelberg game theory to study the misreporting decision of the e-commerce supply chain.First,regardless of the manufacturer’s false reporting of carbon innovation quality information and initial carbon emission cost information,a benchmark model of the e-commerce supply chain that does not consider false reporting behavior is established,and the optimal decision in the benchmark model is analyzed.Then,on the basis of the benchmark model of the ecommerce supply chain,consider three models that the manufacturer only misreports carbon innovation quality information,only misreports initial carbon emission cost information,and falsely reports both carbon innovation quality information and initial carbon emission cost information,and studies the most optimal decision.Then,it studies the influence of manufacturers’ misreporting behavior on society and the decision-making of e-commerce supply chain under the government’s supervision of misreporting behavior.The research shows that(1)when the manufacturer only misreports the quality information of carbon innovation,the manufacturer will choose to overreport the information of carbon innovation quality;when the manufacturer only misreports the initial carbon emission cost information,the manufacturer will choose to underreport the initial carbon emission cost information;When the manufacturer at the same time to misreports carbon innovation quality information and initial carbon emissions cost information,it will comprehensively consider the degree of lies of carbon innovation quality information and initial carbon emissions cost information.(2)Through the research on the social impact of manufacturers’ false reports,it is found that manufacturers’ false reports will have a negative impact on consumer surplus and social welfare.(3)The degree of consumer reaction to the product will counteract the manufacturer’s misrepresentation.(4)The government will maintain the interests of consumers and a fair market order by setting a minimum penalty coefficient for regulation.The article considers the different false reports of manufacturers under the dominant mode of e-commerce platforms,and considers the influence of government supervision on manufacturers’ false reports,and obtains the minimum government penalty coefficient under different false reports.Pricing decisions in regulated supply chains.This paper not only enriches the theoretical research of supply chain,but also provides some theoretical guidance for consumers and the government to deal with the situation of manufacturers’ false reports.