| With the continuous development of global environmental governance and regional integration,a large number of public issues have emerged between regions,especially inter-regional environmental pollution,which has become the focus of common concern for governments at all levels.Environmental pollution is gradually changing from individual cities to regional pollution,and the impact involves a large and deep scope,which brings serious consequences.In the current administrative system of China,the local government’s environmental pollution governance model includes territorial governance and cooperative governance.Ecological and environmental governance itself is systematic,regional and cross-border in nature,which determines that it is difficult to rely on individual local governments to solve environmental pollution problems independently,therefore,local governments are gradually realizing the importance of cooperative governance to solve the current cross-regional environmental pollution problems.However,the process of cooperation among local governments face many difficulties,leading to the dilemma of cooperation among local governments.This paper uses the theories of externality and public goods,holistic governance,and evolutionary games to analyze the evolutionary paths and stabilization strategies of local governments’ behavior in environmental pollution governance by constructing four evolutionary game models of local governments’ territorial and cooperative governance with and without central government constraints,and to explore the factors for reaching and consolidating cooperative governance alliances among local governments.The results of the evolutionary game models show that in order to achieve effective management of environmental pollution across regions,local governments must form effective cooperative governance alliances,and three factors,including,strengthening central incentive constraints,reducing governance costs and reducing the influence of regional space,can promote cross-regional environmental governance cooperation among local governments.In order to verify the findings in the evolutionary game model,a case of cooperative environmental pollution management between local governments in and around the Yangtze River Delta with high case representativeness and theoretical match is selected to further verify the evolutionary logic of cooperative governance among local governments.Finally,starting from three influencing factors: central incentive and constraint mechanism,cost,and regional space,three strategies are proposed to promote cooperation among local governments in cross-territory environmental governance: firstly,by improving the central government’s incentive mechanism for cross-regional environmental governance to fully mobilize government participation;secondly,by reaching consensus,establishing an institutionalized communication and consultation platform and information sharing mechanism to promote inter-local government reach consensus and reduce cross-regional environmental governance and transaction costs;thirdly,by strengthening the organization of cross-regional environmental governance and strengthening joint supervision between governments to reduce the adverse effects of regional space. |
