Study On Risk Sharing Of Subway PPP Project

In recent years,due to the huge initial investment in the construction of rail transit,local governments in China have begun to introduce the PPP model in rail transit,choosing to cooperate with the private sector to alleviate the government’s financial constraints in public infrastructure construction.Under such a model,the private sector can achieve the pursuit of economic benefits,while the government sector can achieve the pursuit of social benefits,and both parties can achieve a win-win situation.However,under the PPP model,due to the increase in the number of participants,the project management becomes more difficult,and it is easy for both parties to shirk the responsibility for the risks arising in the project,resulting in the project not being able to proceed smoothly or even failing.Therefore,it is particularly important to reasonably allocate risks in advance of subway PPP projects and ensure that both parties undertake the risk allocation in accordance with the agreement,which is also a key issue for the participants.Based on the unified standard risk sharing process that has been formed in academia,this paper conducts a detailed study on how the participants in the subway PPP project carry out a reasonable risk allocation and ensure the implementation of the allocation.First,the literature is reviewed to summarize the theories and concepts required under the subway PPP project mode,and then through the analysis of the concepts involved in the principal-agent theory,stakeholder theory,game theory and other related basic theories,combined with the characteristics of the subway PPP model,On the basis of clarifying the participating subjects,sharing objects and the standard process of risk sharing formed by academia,a risk sharing analysis framework for subway PPP projects from initial sharing,risk sharing,risk re-sharing and government supervision is constructed.In the preliminary risk sharing stage,the composition of the risk system of the subway PPP project is revealed.The literature analysis method is used to find out the project risk factor set,and then a preliminary risk sharing game model is constructed to determine whether the risk is unilaterally borne or shared by both parties.Risk requires further negotiation and discussion.In the stage of risk sharing,in the preliminary sharing strategy,the risks that need to be shared by the government and the private sector are obtained,and a risk sharing model is constructed through the bargaining game theory to reasonably allocate these risks that need to be shared.On the basis of the research,based on the theoretical characteristic that risk is transitive in reality,the risk correlation coefficient is introduced,the model is refined,and the optimal risk sharing allocation scheme is finally obtained.In the stage of risk re-sharing,the risk re-sharing of subway PPP projects mainly focuses on the re-sharing of new risks and the risk ratio for implementing risk sharing.Regulation is especially important.Therefore,on the basis of government supervision,an evolutionary game model is established to discuss the establishment of a supervision mechanism to implement the proportion of risks shared by both parties and the response to new risks.Finally,Chengdu metro line 18 is used to apply the above model.The results show that:(1)In the preliminary risk sharing,the participants should pay attention to the prediction of the type of risk,the probability of risk occurrence,and the loss caused by the risk,and allocate the risks reasonably according to their own advantages.Certain preferences,strong cognition and understanding,ability to bear the consequences of risks,clear measures to be taken after risks arise,and strong risk management capabilities,that is to say,the participant has an advantage in dealing with the risks and can bear the risks alone risk.(2)In risk sharing,when both parties do not fully understand each other’s information,the negotiating advantage of government departments will be weakened,and the risks borne by the government will no longer be lower than that of the private sector,and government departments need to take more risks.Based on the realistic condition of risk transfer between risks,the negotiating advantages of government departments will also be weakened to some extent,and for some risks,the degree of risk borne by both parties from the perspective of risk correlation and risk independence There is a large difference,and considering the risk association corrects the error caused by the risk independence and makes the risk sharing result more accurate and reasonable.(3)In the risk re-sharing,the government’s regulatory role plays an important role in the smooth progress of the subway PPP project,and the more important thing in the government’s regulatory process is to improve the reward and punishment mechanism,and at the same time,not only should an appropriately high penalty be set In addition,an incentive fee higher than the fine should be set to motivate both parties to actively take risks in accordance with the risk-sharing ratio determined in the contract.For example,for the private sector,if government regulation finds that the private party is actively sharing risks,it can allow more viability gap subsidies.For the new risks that appear in the middle and late stages of the project,under the supervision of the government,first determine the approximate scope of the risks that the two parties will take according to the size of the losses caused by the new risks,and then the two parties will specifically agree on this scope.When the new risk causes large losses,it is better for both parties to share the risk,and the government department should preferably share between 40% and 60% of the new risk.When the loss caused by the new risk is not large,let one party bear the risk.