| Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast(ADS-B)is a key technology for the next generation of air traffic control,not only as a complement to existing radar positioning technology,but also as an alternative in areas without radar coverage,and has been deployed in most countries and regions worldwide in their airspace.Aircraft equipped with ADS-B equipment obtain precise geographic location and speed information from satellite navigation systems,which is regularly broadcast to ground-based stations and neighbouring aircraft,creating a clear background map and flight path through the cockpit display control system.Unlike radar,which can only be deployed on the ground with limited coverage,ADS-B can extend surveillance to maritime and polar regions,enhancing air situational awareness and flight safety.However,the inherent security deficiencies of the ADS-B protocol have been a hot topic in the industry due to its lack of message authentication mechanisms and vulnerability to position spoofing attacks that expose aircraft to the risk of collision.The security of existing ADS-B message authentication schemes is mainly based on the discrete logarithmic intractability problem on elliptic curves.The construction of such traditional number-theoretic systems is computationally complex,not suitable for implementation on ADS-B airborne devices with limited computational resources,and will become insecure in the future when large-scale quantum computers are available.Therefore,constructing ADS-B authentication schemes that can withstand quantum attacks has become an urgent practical issue and has become an important practical trend.In this thesis,the first lattice-based cryptosystem is applied to ADS-B communication security,and research on ADS-B message authentication and privacy protection protocols is carried out,with the following results:(1)To address the problem that existing ADS-B message authentication schemes mainly use traditional public-key cryptosystems to achieve data security,which are computationally burdensome and cannot resist quantum attacks,a hierarchical certificateless message authentication scheme that supports both message recovery and bulk authentication is proposed.ADS-B on-board devices do not require managed certificates and have no key escrow issues,ADS-B messages do not need to be transmitted with a signature and can be recovered during the authentication phase.Using rejection sampling and trapdoor-free techniques,the scheme only requires linear operations of low computational complexity to authenticate the message.The scheme is certifiably secure under the assumptions of the stochastic prediction machine model and the Small Integer Solution(SIS)problem.Experimental results show a significant performance improvement over related work in terms of computational overhead savings for the same level of bit security,making it suitable for avionics where computational resources are constrained.(2)In certain special application scenarios,such as aircraft requiring anonymous authentication for information-sensitive related tasks,the risk of privacy invasion caused by curious network members or eavesdroppers due to the open and broadcast nature of ASD-B drives the imperative to develop an ASD-B privacy-preserving authentication protocol.In view of this,this thesis proposes a hierarchical certificateless ASD-B anonymous authentication scheme based on a combination of lattice-based trapdoor technology and original image sampling techniques,using a pseudonym mechanism.The scheme identifies the signer in case of anonymity abuse by the signer and ensures that the pseudonym cannot be linked until it is traced.The proposed scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive selection message attacks and satisfies security properties such as traceability and anonymity.Performance evaluation experimental results show that the scheme is more suitable for deployment in real-world scenarios due to its relatively low computational and communication overheads compared to other related work in this area. |
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