| With the increasing demand for convenience and comfort among users,the number of private cars has increased year by year,aggravating urban traffic congestion,environmental pollution and traffic safety issues.As a shared travel method,ride-hailing is of great significance in reducing the idle rate of private cars,increasing the sharing rate of car travel,changing the travel mode of user groups,and reducing the number of private cars.This thesis studies the key factors that influence the transformation of purchasing power from private car ownership to travel service consumption among the car-free groups under different development models of ride-hailing services.It actively guides the car-free groups to make more rational decisions regarding private car ownership and alleviates urban traffic problems from the demand side.The thesis constructs a two-player game model for ride-sharing under ride-hailing services and a three-player game model for ride-sharing and multi-affiliation models.In the ride-sharing game model,the thesis considers the mutual influence among the research objects to improve the replicator dynamic equation in the evolutionary game model.This thesis also analyzes the qualitative changes in private car ownership by considering the short-term profit psychological estimation of the car-free groups purchasing private cars and the short-term cost psychological estimation of the car-owning population driving private cars.In the ride-sharing and multi-affiliation model,the thesis combines the bilateral market theory with the three-player game model to establish a semi-qualitative and semi-quantitative threeplayer game model for user groups,driver groups,and dual-monopoly operators’ platforms with single or multiple affiliations.The results show that when there is no stable evolution direction for user groups and operators,the car-free groups tend to purchase private cars periodically,and the private car ownership will show a periodic growth trend.Measures to increase the number of ride-sharing passengers,improve user willingness to share rides,and reduce platform commission rates can increase ride-sharing vehicle sharing rates,suppress the growth of private car ownership but may reduce the number of users,which is not conducive to the benign development of shared travel.A lower commission rate and higher platform pricing combination may increase private car ownership and idle rates.A higher commission rate and lower platform pricing can suppress the growth of private car ownership but may cause a loss of customers.Choosing the critical crossover intensity,user waiting time,and driver passenger waiting time can suppress the growth of private car ownership and maintain a certain number of shared users. |