Research On The Evolution Of Hidden Moral Behavior Of Bid Evaluation Experts Based On Random Game

Bidding is one of the most important resource allocation methods in the market economy system with Chinese characteristics,and is widely used in the fields of engineering construction,government procurement,import of mechanical and electrical products,and operational procurement of state-owned enterprises.Bid evaluation experts hold the dominant power of evaluation work,and their performance behavior will have the most direct and fundamental impact on the bid evaluation results.In recent years,with the increase of bidding market scale,the bid evaluation expert team has developed and grown,but the quantity and quality development of bid evaluation experts are not proportional,and the cases of bid evaluation experts’rent-seeking,non-cooperation and other hidden ethical behaviors causing the loss of excellent bids and significant project losses have been common,therefore,in order to improve the management level of bid evaluation experts and purify the bid evaluation environment,it is urgent to conduct a study on the compliance behavior of bid evaluation experts,hidden Therefore,in order to improve the management level of bid evaluation experts and clean up the bid evaluation environment,it is urgent to study the compliance behavior and hidden ethical behavior of bid evaluation experts.In this paper,based on the existing research results of domestic and foreign scholars on bid evaluation experts,the mathematical analytic equations of the rooting probability,strategy rooting condition and rooting time of the stochastic evolutionary game model of Wright-Fisher process with selection differences are firstly derived and solved through evolutionary game theory,finite rationality theory,evolutionary dynamics theory of finite populations and other related theories.Then,we applied the Wright-Fisher process with selection differences to bid evaluation expert management,solved the rooting probability,and rooting time of the bid evaluation expert compliance strategy,and compared them with the Moran and Wright-Fisher stochastic processes.Numerical simulations are conducted by MATLAB 2016b to investigate the effects of parameter changes and incentive constraint changes on the rooting of bid evaluation experts’compliance behavior.In order to more intuitively reflect the role of incentive and constraint mechanism and management department supervision,this paper establishes the evolutionary game model of bid evaluation experts and management department,and reveals the evolutionary path and influencing factors of the behavior of bid evaluation experts and management department through theoretical analysis and MATLAB numerical simulation,based on the fact that it is difficult to regulate the hidden moral behavior of bid evaluation experts by static reward and punishment mechanism,and introduces dynamic performance payment mechanism to optimize the fluctuating unstable system.Based on the fact that it is difficult to regulate the hidden moral behaviors of bid evaluation experts by the static reward and punishment mechanism,the dynamic performance payment mechanism is introduced to optimize the fluctuating unstable system,so that the fluctuating unstable equilibrium strategy is transformed into the evolutionary stable strategy,and the effectiveness of the dynamic performance payment mechanism is proved by theory.The research results show that:the rooting time of Wright-Fisher process with selection differences is complex and there is non-convergence;the rooting probability of Wright-Fisher process and Moran process are different but the rooting conditions are the same,and the average conditional rooting time of Moran process when there is no difference is N/2 times that of the Wright-Fisher process;the current compliance strategy rooting rate of bid evaluation experts is less than 2%,which is improved under the incentive constraint mechanism,but less than 3%,and the overall level is low;in the game between bid evaluation experts and management,parameter changes have a direct impact on the behavior of the two subjects,and the behavior of bid evaluation experts and management under different parameter conditions The behavior of bid evaluation experts and management departments under different parameters can evolve directly to the desired evolutionary stable strategy（case 1）or reach the desired evolutionary stable strategy（case 2）by adjusting parameters,while the fluctuating unstable strategy（case 3）cannot be made stable by adjusting parameters;for the control of fluctuating unstable strategy,the static reward and punishment mechanism cannot be adjusted dynamically according to the behavior of bid evaluation experts,which cannot control the stability of the system and is not a systemic stability control strategy.The dynamic performance payment mechanism takes into account the dynamic incentive situation,so that the behavior of the bid evaluation experts can reach a mixed strategy equilibrium,which is the stability control strategy of the system.Finally,based on the results of the theoretical analysis,some more targeted suggestions are provided for managing bid evaluation experts with a view to motivating them to adopt compliant behaviors in their evaluation.The article concludes with a brief description of the shortcomings of this paper’s research and an outlook on future research directions.