Research On The Regulatory Mechanism Of Tax Rebate At Port Of Departure From The Perspective Of Evolutionary Game

The export tax rebate policy is an important trade policy in China,its main role is to avoid double taxation of domestic export commodities,reducing the price of export commodities,improving the competitiveness of domestic commodities in the international market,and creating more export revenue.In order to simplify the tax refund process and promote the construction of an international shipping center in China’s foreign trade hub port,the tax refund policy at the port of departure was officially proposed by the State Council in April 2009 and officially implemented in August 2012.The tax rebate policy at the port of departure is a kind of pre-tax rebate policy,the implementation of which effectively improves the efficiency of export tax rebate and shortens the tax rebate time,but with the gradual expansion of the scope of application,its own regulatory problems are also highlighted.Evolutionary game theory refers to the dynamic game process in which limited subjects participate,and the participants have limited rationality and maximize their own returns,and their strategic choices will be continuously optimized with the change of time and environment,and eventually tend to be stable.Based on evolutionary game theory,this paper constructs an evolutionary game model with port export enterprises and government regulatory departments as the in-house people,and the government regulatory departments,as the leaders of decision-making,affect the decision-making behavior of export enterprises.The ideal stability strategy we expect is for government regulators to choose loose regulation,while exporters choose law-abiding transportation.This paper mainly considers the factors of government incentives,penalties and regulatory costs,puts forward the static reward and punishment mechanism and dynamic reward and punishment mechanism as the reference for the choice of government regulatory strategy,analyzes the sensitivity of the parameters affecting the choice of strategy,and carries out numerical simulation.According to the model analysis and evolutionary simulation results,it can be concluded that in the context of this paper,the static reward and punishment mechanism cannot achieve the ideal stable state,and the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism can obtain the ideal stable state.In the dynamic reward and punishment mechanism,incentives can’t effectively improve the willingness of enterprises to comply with the law,the higher the degree of incentives,but will reduce the level of corporate compliance,so appropriate incentives are conducive to promoting more foreign trade enterprises to adopt the tax rebate policy at the port of departure,but in the long run,incentives are not an effective means.This paper finds that punishment is a more effective regulatory measure,the higher the degree of punishment,the more conducive to the government to adopt a lower proportion of supervision,and at the same time export enterprises will also improve the level of compliance,compared with the level of incentives,the higher the level of punishment,the more conducive to achieving a more ideal balance.Regulatory cost is an important factor that cannot be ignored in regulatory issues,this paper analyzes and finds that the higher the regulatory cost,the lower the probability of export enterprises choosing law-abiding transportation and government regulatory authorities choosing strict supervision,for the government,the lower the regulatory cost,the more conducive to carrying out regulatory work,with lower regulatory costs to achieve better regulatory results is the most ideal state,so controlling regulatory costs is conducive to both parties to achieve an ideal stable state.