Research On The Moral Hazard Of Fishermen In Fisheries Insurance

Fisheries is a major industry in agriculture,and in 2021,the total output of aquatic products in China reached 66.9 million tons,and the output value of fisheries accounted for more than 10% of the total output value of agriculture,forestry,animal husbandry and fisheries,and Shandong Province has reached 14.4% of the proportion.With high protein content and low fat content,aquatic products are an important protein supply food in China and play an important role in China’s food security strategy.Compared with other agriculture,fishery industry has the characteristics of high input,high risk and high loss,and the price of aquatic products is unstable and the income of fishermen is not guaranteed,which is not conducive to the development of fishery industry.Therefore,fisheries insurance should be vigorously promoted and developed to provide protection for the development of fisheries.As part of the insurance market,fishery insurance has the problem of information asymmetry.In order to better develop the fishery insurance industry,we analyze whether there is moral risk for fishermen who participate in fishery insurance for a special form of insurance such as mutual fishery insurance.In this paper,we analyze the moral hazard of fishermen before and after their participation in fishery insurance in order to better promote the development of fishery insurance and provide risk protection for fishery farming.This paper investigates the major aquaculture regions in Shandong Province,such as Yantai,Qingdao,Dongying,Weifang,Jining,Weihai,Rizhao,Binzhou and Linyi,by means of questionnaire surveys,compiles the survey data,and analyzes the data with the help of econometric analysis tools and methods and data analysis software.This paper uses OLS model and Tobit model to analyze whether fishermen who participate in fishery insurance have moral risk,and on this basis,we analyzethe endogeneity problem and conduct counterfactual analysis using endogenous transformation model and propensity score matching method,respectively,to conclude that fishermen have moral risk behaviors after participating in fishery insurance,and then analyze the heterogeneity of different fishermen and make suggestions to further promote the development of fishery insurance suggestions are made.The content of this paper is divided into six parts.The first chapter is the introduction,which includes the research background of the paper,the purpose and significance of the study,literature review,research methodology,technology roadmap,and innovations and shortcomings.Chapter 2 is the definition of concepts and theoretical foundations,where the definition of concepts includes fisheries insurance and moral hazard,and the theoretical foundations include risk management theory,farmer behavior theory and information asymmetry theory,quasi-public goods and positive externalities.Chapter 3 is the analysis of the current situation of fishery insurance,including the development history,current situation and development potential of fishery insurance in China.Chapter 4 is the analysis and measurement of moral hazard,including the theoretical analysis of moral hazard generation,and the measurement of moral hazard.Chapter 5 is the empirical analysis,including data sources,variable selection and descriptive statistics,model construction,analysis of empirical results and heterogeneity analysis;the empirical analysis includes benchmark regression of OLS model and Tobit model,endogeneity test using endogenous transformation model,and robustness test using propensity score matching method;the heterogeneity analysis includes the analysis of different farming methods,different age groups,different gender and Heterogeneity analysis includes heterogeneity analysis of fishermen with different farming methods,different age groups,different gender,and different education levels.Chapter 6concludes the study and suggests countermeasures.The conclusions obtained from the previous empirical evidence are summarized,and suggestions are made to further improve fishery insurance.By studying the moral risk of fishermen in fisheries insurance,this paper concludes that fishermen’s moral risk measures decrease after insurance,reduce risk management behaviors,and decrease the level of efforts to prevent and reduce losses,and fishermen’s moral risk arises after insurance;moral risk is higher in freshwater aquaculture than in marine aquaculture,older fishermen have higher moral risk than younger fishermen,men have higher moral risk than women,and educated The moral risk is higher for older fishermen than for younger fishermen,higher for men than for women,and higher for fishermen with a high level of education than for those with a low level of education.To further improve fishery insurance,this paper puts forward relevant suggestions,including increasing the publicity of fishery insurance,innovating fishery insurance products,improving fishery insurance mechanism,incorporating fishery insurance into policy agricultural insurance,and innovating fishery insurance contract structure.