The Problem Of Justice In Hume’s Moral Sentimentalism

On the one hand,Hume’s theory of justice attracts much attention because it shows a brand new aspect,and enlightens and enriches the thinking and research of justice.On the other hand,it has been questioned and criticized from the beginning.These criticisms may come from different perspectives,but the central question is how can justice based on self-interest be considered a virtue? How can justice without any natural emotional basis be placed in the moral theory of Hume’s sentimentalism?This paper is an attempt to solve these problems.In short,we will distinguish between two meanings of Hume’s concept of justice.On the one hand,a series of justice rules,of which the core is property rights,are formed based on the usefulness of justice for social cooperation,and presuppose the limited egoism of human beings.On the other hand,it is sympathy that gives us the moral sense to approve with justice and condemn injustice,which constitutes the reason why justice can become virtue,and can therefore be regarded as the moral basis of just virtue.Therefore,Hume’s theory of justice not only does not contradict his moral theory of sentimentalism,but is an important part of the latter.In order to finally show how sympathy can form the moral sentiment required by the virtue of justice,this paper mainly explains Hume’s theory of moral sense in the second chapter,where we clarify the role of sympathy in the formation of moral sense,and defend the moral validity of Hume’s judgment based on moral sense.In this chapter,we also distinguish between the psychological concept of sympathy and the normative concept of sympathy,and try to show the differences between Hume’s moral theory of sentimentalism and other moral theories of sentimentalism.In the third chapter,we will explain Hume’s theory of the origin of justice in two different aspects or senses.One is that the rule of justice is formed through artificial agreement;the second is the formation of a moral sentiment corresponding to justice.The formation of this sentiment depends on a broad sympathy as distinct from the narrow natural sympathy,and only through this broad sympathy can we obtain a feeling of the public interest which justice requires.Although Hume’s theory of justice is mainly expressed as a series of justice rules with property rights as the core,the normative basis of his view of justice lies in the feeling of this public interest.This is also the essential difference between Hume’s theory of justice and social contract theory.Since the possibility of justice is based on moral sentiment,Hume’s theory of justice can naturally be placed in his sentimentalism moral theory.Since Hume believes that self-interest is the original motive to the establishment of the rule of justice,Hume’s view of justice is often charged of egoism by some important criticism.In the fourth chapter of this paper,we will give a Hume-style response to this question by clarifying the meaning of self-interest in Hume’s view of justice,combining with the problem of "sensible knave" discussed by Hume.