The Emotional Approach To Normative Problems

In some sense, Hume’s ethics is in a little awkward position in scholars’ discussions on moral normativity, since for one thing, the ethics establishes its emotionalism position based on reason’s inactivity, and regards feeling as goal, reason as tool, but it therefore has difficulties with building justification for normativity. For another, rationalism interpretations for Hume’s ethics still exist, which admit reason’s inactivity, but meanwhile defend moral normativity in a rational way that explains moral sense and rules of justice as products of reason and Hume’s ethics’normativity side as embodiment of utilitarianism and contract theory. This article aims to reflect rationalism interpretations for Hume’s ethics, tries to retort them through two dimensions, motivation and commonality of feeling, and hence presents how moral normativity forms through feeling in Hume’s Ethics during this process. It is divided into four parts as following:Chapter one presents rationalism interpretations for moral sense and rules of justice. Namely, in the generation process of both, reason always plays the dominant role, which causes doubts on emotionalism’s value in justification for normativity. To be specific, in explanations for moral sense, it is reason that defines utility and guarantees the objectivity of moral sense, and only through perspective of the spectator’s correction of partial sympathy, could universal moral sympathy occur. In explanations for roles of justice, justice are considered as artificial virtues, which differentiate from natural virtues and origin from rational contract rather than natural feelings.The second chapter demonstrates Hume’s emotionalism ethics position and his basic points, to preliminarily establish the standpoint of response to rationalism explanations. Hume deems that reason can not serves a motivating role, but just has indirect influence on feeling. The function of reason is to present facts with neutral value, therefore it only matters whether an object is true or false, not good or evil. This is the basis on which Hume retorts rationalism and establishes emotionalism. Moreover, what I also present in this part is the feature of moral sense and how it is generated through sympathy, namely the positive depiction of Hume’s emotionalism position.In chapter three, the initial response to rationalism explanation through motivation of feeling is indicated, which shows feelings’motivating effect how indispensable during the formation of moral sense and roles of justice. In discussions on moral sense, sympathy with the public interest gives rise to concerns with public utility, which lays the foundation for moral sense’s formation. Meanwhile, sense of public interest also possesses the commonality necessary to moral sense, and yet interpretation through the perspective of the spectator is under doubts. In discussion on roles of justice, self-interest is the original motive and binding power, and sense of public interest functions as the origin of sense of justice and final constraining force of the roles.This part also manifests that issues remain to be explored in two previous responses since both moral sense and roles of justice depend on sense of public interest, but reason may still play the critical role in process of reaching an general judgment on an character’s public utility and process of generating roles of justice, namely from self-interest to sense of public interest, because debates exist about what the public interest is, or how to realize it. Therefore, clarifying that feelings is the mind of power that consensus depends on is the key to defense emotionalism position. It is a process that common sense of public interest forms through feeling, during which consistent moral sense and roles of justice, namely the common norms also generates.Chapter four demonstrates the normativity of feelings, which means common sense with normativity forms purely through feelings. On one hand, social views on characters’public utility are generated through communication among feelings, not by calculating the homogeneous utilities like utilitarianism, but through a spontaneous social process. On the other, roles of justice are customs resulted from accumulated experiences, rather than by discussions or deductions of reason, which is clearly presented in the gradual and cumulative formation through experiences’correction and the spontaneous feature, like language and currency’s, which makes justice regarded as product of artificial and unintended design, between nature and reason design. Experience accumulation is the same process as feelings communication, both of which depend on sympathy’s function of conveying feelings. Thereby, moral norms are common senses generated by sympathy. To sum up, feelings are sources of justifying normativity in Hume’s emotionalism ethics, while reason is not the dominant element during the formation of moral sense and roles of justice, which conforms with Hume’s cause and effect theory and other points of view related.