On “Sensible Intuition” In Kant’s Critique Of Pure Reason

In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,"sensible intuition" plays an important role.Through "sensible intuition",Kant thought that he proved in "transcendental sensibility" that the objects of our cognition,namely the objects of sensible intuition,are appearances,and called this theory "transcendental idealism".This argument is inseparable from Kant’s unique conception of time and space,which are the pure forms of our sensible intuition.However,through the investigation of Kant’s text,the metaphysical exposition of time and space does not directly point to this conclusion.Kant’s intention is clear,if we understand that time and space are only the pure forms of our sensible intuition,then the objects of our sensible intuition can only be appearances.The question is: why should conceiving time and space as pure forms of our sensible intuition lead to such a conclusion? Kant did not elaborate further.However,in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason,Kant added an argument to the appendix to the Transcendental Sensibility to prove this conclusion.The basic structure and main contents of this paper are as follows: the first chapter discusses Kant’s concept of "intuition",including the definition and elements of "intuition",the relationship between "intuition" and "representation",the relationship between "intuition" and "concept",the relationship between "sensible intuition" and "intellectual intuition",and the division of "sensible intuition" into "empirical intuition" and "pure intuition".The second chapter discusses the pure sensible intuitionistic form--space and time and their interpretation.It includes three contents: first,Newton and Leibniz’s understanding of space and time,and Kant’s criticism of them;2.Kant’s metaphysical exposition of space and time,which explains that space and time are sensible forms and a priori,not derived from experience;3.Kant’s transcendental statement of space and time shows that such a claim to space and time is fruitful because it explains the possibilities of mathematical knowledge.The third chapter discusses the ideality of sensible intuitionistic form.Kant gives this argument in the appendix to transcendental sensibility,showing that the objects of our sensible intuitions are appearances.But this argument is too vague to accomplish Kant’s goal.However,an argument can be developed based on the analysis given by Kant in the Introduction to the Metaphysics of the Future.The point is that if the object of our sensible intuition is the thing-itself,then a priori intuition is impossible;But Kant shows that a priori intuitions are possible,which means that the objects of sensible intuitions are appearances.Conclusion: Kant’s argument is valid.