Structural Dilemma Of Local Supervision System In Qianlong Dynasty Viewed From The “Corruption Case Donation And Embezzling Relief In Gansu Province”

During the reign of Qianlong,the local supervisory power was mainly granted to the governors.Local self-inspection was implemented,supplemented by external supervision from the central government,including the supervision of censors and imperial envoys.Although local self-inspection has its inherent logic and reasonable explanation,its defects are also very obvious.The independence of supervision power disappears.It lacks the confrontation mechanism of supervisory power.Supervisory power and imperial power are increasingly alienated.The governor in power becomes a vacuum of power supervision.The external inspection from the central government is equally difficult.Censor is based in Beijing with a limited number of people and his responsibilities are complicated.He has no time to take care of it.Imperial envoy is mostly individual,temporary and ex-post.It is difficult to regard as the normal local supervision and has limited effect.The problems existing in the above supervision system are important reasons for the poor local supervision in the Qianlong dynasty.Taking the corruption case of donating and embezzling relief in Gansu as a sample,we can observe and analyze the obstacles and difficulties of this system in its operation clearly and concretely.