On The Priori Grounds Of Ugliness In Kant’s Aesthetics

In the third Critique,Kant proposed the concept of "pure beauty",which led scholars to construct the concept of "pure ugliness".However,there is no consensus in academia on whether "pure ugliness" exists.This article argues that this issue needs to be approached in two levels: whether ugliness has priori grounds and whether it requires a concept.The author examines existing viewpoints in multiple domains and proposes the concept of "interruption of synthesis activity" to comprehensively understand ugliness in Kant’s philosophy,distinguishing between micro and macro levels,abstract and complete expressions,and priori and empirical perspectives.I argue that the source of ugliness is primarily empirical rather than priori.The discourse on ugliness in Kant’s philosophy is unclear in both concept and problem,and this article clarifies them in the first chapter.Section one distinguishes the different uses of the term "pure" in the first and third Critiques,arguing that scholars’ focus is on the existence of the priori grounds of ugliness rather than the existence of "pure ugliness".Section two divides the issue of whether there are priori grounds for ugliness into five problem domains: proof based on the relationship between beauty and ugliness,proof based on disharmonious free play,proof based on the relationship between aesthetics and cognition,proof based on the principle of teleology,and proof based on moral perspective.The article also briefly outlines the last two problem domains that are not the focus of this study.In addition to indirectly interpreting ugliness from the perspective of beauty and ugliness,some scholars directly believe that ugliness is "disharmonious free play".However,Kant did not explicitly indicate whether "disharmonious free play" exists,so this view is controversial.Chapter 3,Section 1 points out that scholars all recognize that the key to solving the problem is whether pleasure and the act of judging can be separated,and whether there is "disharmony".The affirmative view is that there is no disharmony,and if this view is established,ugliness has no priori grounds;the negative view is that there is disharmony,and if this view is established,ugliness has priori grounds.The problem of whether disharmonious free play exists cannot be concluded from a purely aesthetic perspective.As the discussion progresses,the problem view expands from a purely aesthetic perspective to the relationship between aesthetics and cognition.Section 2 discusses the relationship between aesthetics and cognition,and the focus of the problem becomes whether the transition from cognition to aesthetics is possible.There are two views: the affirmative view is that cognition can transition to aesthetics,and if this view is established,ugliness does not have priori grounds.The negative view is that cognition cannot transition to aesthetics,and if this view is established,ugliness has priori grounds.I cite Kant’s texts and Wang Weijia’s relevant discussions,and explain Guyer’s "post-cognition" model as a defense for the affirmative view.In discussions of ugliness in Kant’s philosophy,a common approach is to draw conclusions about ugliness based on Kant’s own discussions of beauty and the relationship between beauty and ugliness.Chapter two examines the issue of the priori grounds of ugliness from the perspective of the relationship between beauty and ugliness.There are two positions on this issue: the affirmative position argues that the relationship between beauty and ugliness cannot lead to the conclusion that ugliness has priori grounds,while the negative position argues that such a conclusion can indeed be drawn.Section one outlines the structure of the relationship between beauty and ugliness,including "Continuity Theory" and the "Value Theory",and concludes by classifying the relationship between beauty and ugliness to expand the possibilities for discussing ugliness.Section two introduces scholars’ attempts to prove the existence or non-existence of priori grounds for ugliness based on the relationship between beauty and ugliness,and the article argues that these proofs rely on a simple "logical opposition" rather than Kant’s idea of "real opposition".Finally,the article shows that the argument for the priori grounds of ugliness from the perspective of aesthetic disputes is not valid by limiting the scope of "universal validity".Chapter 4 proposes a comprehensive solution for understanding ugliness in Kantian context.Section 1 starts from the highest principle of all use of the understanding and establishes a micro model of successful and interrupted synthesis activities,and explains the category of "absurdity" to deepen the understanding of interrupted synthesis activities.Colinwood and Adorno’s viewpoints are cited to illustrate that the source of ugliness is also the interruption of synthesis activities,and finally,the similarities and differences between the categories of ugliness and absurdity are compared.Section 2 distinguishes in three ways: first,distinguishing between micro and macro levels to solve the coexistence of "Aesthetic Trivalence Theory" and "Two Valued Aesthetics ";second,distinguishing from the perspective of abstraction and wholeness to respond to the challenge that ugliness has no priori grounds;and finally,distinguishing from the perspective of innate and empirical to solve the coexistence of "Two Valued Aesthetics" and "One Valued Aesthetics".These distinctions are the key to understanding ugliness correctly in Kantian context and solving existing problems.