How Did Pittsburgh School Interpret And Remold Kant’s Theory Of Intuition

From Pittsburgh School’s point of view,neither empirical foundationalism nor abstractionism can satisfactorily justify the possibility of knowledge,because they all left some key points in the formulation of knowledge unexplained.In contrast,they believe that only conceptual contents can justify our knowledge.More specifically,Pittsburgh scholars answer the question ‘are perceptual experiences conceptual ’in affirmative.Therefore,they name their view by ‘conceptualism’,and accordingly,name the contesting view by ‘non-conceptualism’.Both conceptualists and non-conceptualists have appealed for Kant’s Theory of Intuition,to support their own views.On the one hand,conceptualists make great emphasis on the Kantian claim ‘Intuitions without conceptions are blind’,on the basis of which they confirm that intuitions are inferential.On the other hand,non-conceptualists interpret the claim as only expressing how intuitions without conceptions are like,and making no judgments concerning the possibility of ‘blind intuitions’.As we can tell,the interpretative disagreement between these two groups is the key to the controversy at hand.So,the main aim in this article is to reconstruct interpretations from both sides,and to analyze how the disagreement occurs.The article is divided into three chapters:In the first chapter,I will reconstruct Wilfred Sellars’ interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Intuition,which is the basis on which Sellars provided us with a way to describe the process of knowledge acquisition in the structure ‘experience-intellect’.In particular,Sellars’ thoughts consists of four parts: 1)Objections to foundationalism and abstractionism.He thought that these two theories both involve an ‘Myth of the Given’,and examined the concept of sensory material as a core in the ‘Myth’.2)A direct interpretation of Kant’s Theory of Intuition.In short,from Sellars’ point of view,Kant used the concept ‘intuition’ in two senses.3)A re-examination on ‘the Myth of Given’.Hereby Sellars construed a third way out other than mythical approaches.4)The conclusion that knowledge are justified by inferential intuitions and conceptual contents.In the second chapter,we come to Robert Brandom’s and John Mc Dowell’s interpretations of Kant’s Theory of Intuition.I will discuss their non-mythical solutions,differences between their proposals,and their criticisms of Sellars’ thought.The second chapter is further divided into three sections:In the first section,I will show Mc Dowell’s interpretation.Briefly,he thought that intuitions are productions of the cooperation between a subjects’ s passive and spontaneous abilities,henceforth they are conceptual.In the second section,we will see how Brandom and Mc Dowell justify the‘empirical-intellectual’ foundationalism.In particular,three key points in their thought will be discussed in length: 1)Mc Dowell’s examinations of Sellars’ work.He believed that Sellars’ distinction between impressions and thoughts is not satisfactory,which in fact prevents him from getting the rid of empirical foundationalism.2)Mc Dowell’s interpretations of ‘intuitions’.This interpretative work makes room for his own thoughts,which we have to reconsider the role played by the intellect in our experiences.3)Brandom’s combination of pragmatism and rationalism,from which a referential view of practice originated.In the third section,I will compare Brandom’s solution with Mc Dowell’s,and illustrate their genuine disagreements.In total,we can say that Mc Dowell’s view locates more closely to Kant,while Brandom is much largely influenced by Hegelian thoughts.In the third chapter,I will discuss responses from the Pittsburgh School to nonconceptualistic reasons.This chapter is also divided into three sections:In the first section,we will see non-conceptualists’ interpretation of ‘Intuitions without conceptions are blind’ in more detail.There are two crucial points made by them:1)‘Blind intuitions’ are non-conceptual by definition,whose a priori form are provided by the space and time.2)Non-conceptual intuitions do not bare the conceptualists’ charge that they would constitute a ‘Myth of the Given’.On the contrary,unlike what conceptualists have supposed them to be,non-conceptual intuitions are not a group of unordered and chaotic manifolds.So,as non-conceptualist say,knowledge are not solely justified by inferential contents,empirical certainty can be obtained solely on the ground of aesthetic certainty.In a word,beliefs can be justified without invoking to any inferential ability.In the second and third sections,I will present direct objections from conceptualists to non-conceptualists.In summary,they propose three lines of arguments: 1)Nonconceptual contents are cognitively meaningless.In general,there is a tension between non-conceptualism and the transcendental deduction: the former can not provide intuitions with objectivity.2)‘Synthesis’ is a crucial stage in knowledge formulation.Non-conceptualists believe that this is done by the imagination as an aesthetic ability.In contrast,conceptualists believe that synthesis is a spontaneous ability,henceforth it can only be done by the intellect,and so it is surely conceptual.3)Robert Hanna distinguishes figurative synthesis and conceptual synthesis in an essential manner,and thinks that the former,while being an aesthetic ability,is enough to regulate non-conceptual contents in a low-layer sense.However,from conceptualists’ point of view,the distinction is in conflict with Kant’s own intentions,therefore it is unacceptable.According to Kant,the two kinds of synthesis is continuous,their joint operation is necessary for there to be objective cognition.Finally,after all these examinations,according to my analysis and understanding of Kant’s theory,I conclude: The conceptualistic interpretation is more coherent,and the non-conceptualistic view relies much on some slippery points in Kant’s work.Nevertheless,Pittsburgh scholars’ work is still insufficient,in the sense that they are still justifying knowledge in an empirical foundationalistic fashion.And even if we grant that they have done enough in moving away from empirical foundationalism,their belief in‘empirical-intellectual’ foundationalism is still in need of justification.So,at this stage,I conclude that the coherentistic interpretation is more preferable.