Study On Husserl’s Phenomenology Overcoming Psychologism

Husserl’s reflection on the issue of psychologism runs through his entire system of thought.Therefore,at different stages of the development of phenomenology,Husserl’s reflection on naturalism has been extended to varying degrees.Whether it is the early clearing of the shadow of psychologism in logical principles or the later suspension of psychologism in pure phenomenological epistemology,the problem of psychologism 哈has always occupied an essential position in Husserl’s philosophical development.This paper traces a critical path from the description of psychology to the phenomenological critique of psychologism,based on Husserl’s criticism of psychologism at different stages of his philosophical development.Chapter one begins with the psychology that significantly influenced Husserl’s thought in his early years,including naturalistic psychology and its naturalistic core,Dilthey’s descriptive psychology,and Brentano’s intentional psychology.By analyzing the basic views of these three different schools of psychology mentioned above,the chapter highlights Husserl’s critiques and developments of them.The first section of the second chapter of the paper Chapter focuses on volume one of Husserl’s "Logical Investigations" as a key text.It analyzes and criticizes the attempts of psychologism,mainly based on the empiricism of Mill and the biological naturalism of Mach,to lay the theoretical foundation for logical principles.It then explains the shortcomings of the logical principles themselves.In section two,it illustrates the issue of the concept of number in "Philosophy of Arithmetic" through the category intuition concept in "Logical Investigations" and distinguishes between category intuition and essence intuition.Finally,it points out that during the period of "Logical Investigations," Husserl’s phenomenology was based on a combination of phenomenological method and descriptive psychology as a core for consciousness analysis,which did not escape from psychologism in essence.Chapter Three of this paper provides a detailed argument for the reductionist approach of transcendental phenomenology.Firstly,it responds to the dualism of epistemology in modern philosophy and epistemology influenced by naturalism.It introduces the suspension of phenomenology and reveals the domain of the absolute givenness,which takes the pure givenness of inner consciousness as its research field.Then,it outlines a path towards transcendental phenomenology through the phenomenological reduction of the Cartesian path,with the ultimate goal of overcoming psychologism and establishing transcendental philosophy.By comparing and analyzing the reductionist approaches to phenomenology during the period of descriptive psychology and the period of transcendental phenomenology,the paper concludes that this path is a purely phenomenological reductionist path that thoroughly overcomes psychologism.This paper,through the analysis and organization of Husserl’s critiques of psychological realism throughout his philosophical development,reveals a path of criticism towards psychological realism from descriptive psychology to transcendental phenomenology.By examining Husserl’s understanding and criticisms of psychological realism at different stages,this paper clarifies that this path is a pure phenomenological owe that overcomes psychological realism.