| Public goods financing is a hot issue in the field of welfare economics.Due to various reasons,the centralized supply of public goods led by the government has some defects in supply efficiency and flexibility;therefore,more flexible and efficient,simple and easy financing mechanism of public goods has always been the focus of economists.The research object of this paper is the "lottery" mechanism which can be used for public goods financing;this paper studies the influence of different lottery designs on the financing ability of "lottery" mechanism by constructing theoretical model,and designs a series of experiments based on the model to show the performance of different financing mechanisms,and to support the prediction results of the theory.Through the theoretical model,this paper finds that the "lottery" mechanism has different financing capacity of public goods under different bonus designs.Specifically,when the participants are risk averse and symmetrical,the income of public goods is monotonically increasing and concave,the performance ranking of different "lottery"mechanisms under the same award amount is that the FIX lottery mechanism is better than the HYB lottery mechanism,better than the PRO lottery mechanism,the FIX lottery mechanism is better than the VCM mechanism,and the financing amount of each mechanism cannot reach the social optimal supply level.In this paper,80 subjects were randomly recruited to test the actual effect of different financing mechanisms.The experimental results basically confirmed the theoretical prediction.To sum up,this paper thinks that it is possible to increase the financial burden of public goods through the design of lottery financing mechanism.Considering that the PRO mechanism is the main type of local lottery in which local governments can control their income independently,in order to raise more public funds under the same financial pressure,this paper thinks that it may be effective and beneficial to consider adjusting the design of lottery prizes. |
