| In China,the upsurge of urbanization has led to the continuous expansion of the scale of population mobility.In addition,the implementation of the one-child policy at the end of the 20th century has led to the “421” family structure.The previous family support model has been unable to meet the needs of the elderly group.Market-oriented service for the aged is the general trend.However,the construction cycle of pension institutions is long and the cost is high.Therefore,the home care the service model should be needed.The development of this pension model will play an important role in solving the problem of aging in China.The Chinese government is also working hard to guide the transformation of the home-based care service model.The purpose is to change the main body of providing home care services.After years of development,the home care service model has achieved good results.At the same time,there are also some problems in the process.For example,the types of services provided for the elderly are too single and the inability to meet the needs of the elderly on time.However,the service quality for the aged presents the comprehensive embodiment of a series of services and products provided by service providers and their suppliers.Thus,the service quality at the end of the home care service supply chain is the key to measure the service quality for the aged care service supply chain.This paper established an evolutionary game model including the government,service providers and consumers to solve the quality problems of home care services.This paper analyzed the strategy selection of the subject of the game and proposes the system evolution equilibrium stable strategy combination.Besides,this paper summarized the conditions for satisfy the optimal evolution equilibrium stable strategy combination.We used Matlab software to simulate the system evolution process to determine the specific influencing factors of the optimal strategy combination and reached the following conclusions: Firstly,Whether the government chooses strict supervision over service suppliers is mainly affected by the cost of strict supervision and the government’s social credibility.The higher the cost of regulation,the less motivated the government is to choose“strict regulation”.The improvement of government social credibility can effectively promote the government to choose the "strict supervision" strategy.Secondly,The strategy selection of service providers is mainly restricted by the amount of rewards and fines.The increase of rewards and fines effectively suppressed the incentive of service providers to choose “low quality service”.Thirdly,The increase of the reward amount for reporting can promote consumers’ enthusiasm to “report”.At the same time,the increase in the amount of malicious reporting fines and the cost of reporting will encourage consumers to choose the "no-report" strategy. |
