Research On Quality Control And Coordination Of Elderly Service Supply Chain Based On Evolutionary Game

As my country has entered an aging society,in order to meet the growing social pension needs and national policy requirements of my country’s aging population,the concept of service supply chain has been introduced into the development of the pension service industry.To jointly provide professional and one-stop services for the elderly,and to improve the quality of elderly care services by controlling and coordinating the quality of elderly care services,so as to achieve the overall progress and development of the elderly care service industry.In view of this,on the basis of analyzing the quality control and coordination of the supply chain of senior care services,this paper uses evolutionary game theory to explore the evolutionary law of the game process and strategy choice between integrators and suppliers in quality control.In order to promote the cooperation between enterprises in the supply chain of elderly care services,realize the effective allocation of resources in the supply chain of elderly care services,and improve the service quality of supply chain services for elderly care services.The elderly care service supply chain ultimately achieves the goal of maximize the total efficiency of the supply chain of the elderly care services and improve the overall efficiency of the supply chain of elderly care services core competitiveness.This paper is supported by evolutionary game theory and conducts in-depth research the evolution process of decision-making in quality control and coordination between integrators and providers of the elderly care supply chain,and on this basis,explores the quality control of elderly care supply chain quality control considering the supervision of the elderly.and the impact of punishment mechanism on the evolution of both parties’ decision-making in the quality coordination of the supply chain of elderly care services.The peroration shows that the evolutionary equilibrium of quality control of integrators and providers is closely related to the conflict of interests of both parties.The integrator chooses a strict supervision strategy when the difference in the cost paid by the integrator in the supervision is smaller than the penalty it receives.Only when the difference between the costs paid in the service process is less than the sum of the penalties and compensations received,the performance strategy will be selected;the cost and benefit of quality control and coordination are important factors in determining the behavior of both parties,and quality control and coordination are important factors Benefit greater than cost is the root of both parties’ behavioral decisions;additional cost,spillover benefit,excess benefit,and distribution ratio are the key factors affecting quality coordination between integrators and providers.Quality coordination,an appropriate ratio of excess income distribution can maximize the quality coordination between the two parties,and a reasonable punishment mechanism is conducive to promoting quality coordination between the two parties.MATLAB digital simulation experiment also proofed the aforesaid verdicts.On account of the aforesaid consequence,this thesis proposes counterplan and advice to promote the quality control and coordination of the supply chain of elderly care services,which has certain reference significance for promoting the quality improvement and sustainable and healthy development of the supply chain of the elderly care service.