Study On Evolutionary Game Mechanism Of Emergency Material Reserve Strategy From The Perspective Of Multiple Subjects

How to make proper decisions when emergencies occur is a powerful shock that every country and social organisation around the globe faces.For a long time now,the progress of human society has been accompanied by a steady deterioration of the ecological environment,especially in recent years when public health incidents have been on the rise.Emergency supplies are the material basis of emergency relief and their adequacy will be directly related to the efficiency and effectiveness of relief efforts.To minimise the damage caused by disasters to people,a sound emergency response system is necessary,of which the handling of emergencies is one of the key aspects.Since the massive earthquake in Zhangbei,Sichuan in 1998,China has gradually established a centralised emergency supplies reserve system and has provided effective relief in emergencies in recent years.However,due to the large size of China,the variety of disasters and the increased frequency of public health events compared to the past,the current stockpile of emergency materials does not match the current emergency relief needs.Based on the above,the emergency materials stockpile can make use of market forces and social resources to improve the level of social and corporate stockpiles,thereby expanding the scale of the emergency materials stockpile and further enhance the level of emergency supplies reserves.Based on the evolutionary game,the paper analyses the opportunistic behaviour of the government,storage companies and the public in the process of stockpiling emergency materials before the occurrence of emergency emergencies,and constructs a tripartite game model for the government,storage companies and the public.Specifically,firstly,considering the influence of government incentives and penalties on the behavioural choices of storage companies and the public,a tripartite evolutionary game model of emergency supplies reserve based on government subsidies is constructed,and the influence of government subsidies and penalties on the behavioural strategy choices of game subjects is analysed.Finally,MATLAB2 0 1 9 software is used to simulate the model developed in this paper to verify the rationality and validity of the model and to conduct specific analysis based on the simulation results.Finally,the model is simulated using MATLAB 2019 software to verify the rationality and validity of the model.Through the construction,solution and simulation of the model using MATLAB2019 software,the following important conclusions can be obtained: when considering the influence of the government subsidy mechanism on the behaviour of the three parties,the reward and punishment mechanism set by the government should meet the condition that the sum of the reward and punishment amount of the government to the storage enterprises and the public should be at least greater than the benefit of their respective choices of opportunistic behaviour,the storage enterprises and the public’ s The behavioural strategies of the storage companies and the public will be biased towards active storage of emergency supplies and strict regulation respectively.In summary,the thesis constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model for the process of stockpiling emergency materials under the government subsidy mechanism.Through solving the model and simulations,it analyses the mutual game process among the government,storage companies and the public in the process of stockpiling emergency materials,which provides theoretical reference and reference for avoiding the occurrence of speculative behaviour in the process of stockpiling emergency materials and improving the level of stockpiling emergency materials.