Anti Monopoly Regulation Of Internet Platform Enterprises’ Abuse Of Market Dominance From The Perspective Of Bilateral Markets

Since the 20 th century,with the rise and rapid development of Internet technology,Internet platform enterprises characterized by "Internet plus" have increasingly affected all aspects of the country,society and people’s daily life.However,with the development of the market,some Internet head platform enterprises began to show oligopoly or oligopoly market structure in various industries,which led to the suppression of market competition and many abuses of market dominance.Based on this,combining the theory of bilateral markets and the characteristics of the internet,it is particularly necessary to clarify the commonalities and particularities between internet platforms and traditional industries,and regulate the abuse of market dominance by internet platform enterprises.The main body of the entire article consists of four parts:The first chapter is an introduction to the theories related to the abuse of market dominance by platform enterprises in the bilateral market.Based on a clear definition of the concept of the bilateral market,the characteristics of the bilateral market are summarized,including cross network effects,asymmetric price structures,bilateral complementarity and interdependence.The bilateral market is classified based on three perspectives: market structure,strategy selection,and market function.The application of the Internet has further amplified the bilateral market characteristics of platform enterprises.The Internet platform also has its particularity different from the general platform.With the strengthening of platform control,competition for attention has become the focus of competition.The natural expansion trend has led to high market concentration ratio and the refinement of market entry barriers,which ultimately presents a winner take all situation.In practice,the behavior of internet platform enterprises abusing their market position is more common,including differential treatment,refusal to trade,and restricted trading.These behaviors are characterized by higher concealment,higher frequency of behavior occurrence,and combined with the functional agglomeration trend of the platform,with the goal of capturing consumer surplus and producer surplus as the goal and attention becoming free consideration.The second chapter summarizes,summarizes,and analyzes the current situation and problems faced by the regulation of internet platform enterprises’ abuse of market dominance behavior.In terms of legislative status,there are not only the overall design of the Anti Monopoly Law,but also the Guidelines of the State Council Anti Monopoly Commission on the Definition of Relevant Markets regarding the definition of bilateral markets,as well as the Anti Monopoly Guidelines of the State Council Anti Monopoly Commission on the Field of Platform Economy specifically targeting internet platforms.In terms of law enforcement status,an analysis was conducted on three cases in recent years where Meituan,Alibaba,and CNKI were punished for abusing their dominant market position.In terms of judicial status,list and summarize recent judicial cases.Based on the above current situation,the problems of abusing market dominance by internet platform enterprises in China are proposed,including difficulties in defining the relevant market,identifying market dominance,insufficient law enforcement and judicial regulation,and difficulties in regulating super platforms.The third chapter analyzes the regulations of the European Union,the United States,and Japan regarding the abuse of market dominance by internet platform enterprises.The EU adopts the hypothetical monopolist testing method and supply substitution analysis method to define the relevant market,especially establishing a gatekeeper system for super platforms,proposing gatekeeper standards,specifying detailed obligations,and greater punishment.The United States has proposed a new method for defining related markets,namely the performance testing method,which has reduced the importance of defining related markets and strengthened the use of necessary facility principles.Japan has improved traditional market definition methods using SSNDQ and SSNIC testing methods,comprehensively considering various factors to identify the abuse of market dominance,and implementing special regulations for super platforms.Finally,the inspiration from extraterritorial experience was summarized,including improving relevant market definition methods,the importance of reducing market share,and implementing special regulations for super platforms.The fourth chapter refers to the aforementioned extraterritorial experience and proposes constructive countermeasures and suggestions that are in line with China’s national conditions,in response to the current situation and existing problems in regulating the abuse of market dominance by Chinese internet platform enterprises in Chapter 2.In terms of defining relevant markets,the platform is divided into trading bilateral markets and non trading bilateral markets to choose markets with competitive constraints.Substitution analysis and hypothetical monopolist testing methods are improved,and product performance testing methods are introduced.Refine the standards for market share,including dividing the sales revenue of non-trading bilateral markets based on attention,weakening the proportion of sales revenue in the market share recognition standards,establishing practical and feasible diversified market share recognition standards,and enriching the factors that consider the difficulty of other operators entering relevant markets.Strengthen regulatory efforts to abuse market dominance,enhance antitrust law enforcement deterrence,and reduce the difficulty of judicial litigation.Establish a hierarchical platform supervision mechanism as soon as possible,increase the supervision and regulation of super platforms,and adopt a relatively tolerant attitude towards small and medium-sized platforms.