Anti-monopoly Regulation On Self-preferencing Of Internet Platforms

The prosperity and development of the Internet industry has spawned many large-scale digital platforms.These platforms have built a convenient bridge for Internet users and enterprises.In order to seek greater profit growth,Internet platforms have also developed self-operated businesses while operating platform businesses.The combination of platform self-operation and third-party operator business provides richer and more valuable choices for network users.While the business model of Internet platforms is convenient for people,it will also lead to potential monopoly risks: Internet platforms essentially have dual identities as platform managers and self-operated business operators.Non-public data generated by users and operators,and even manipulate platform rules to give preferential treatment to self-operated businesses,which is likely to damage the legitimate interests of operators on the platform and the normal order of market competition,and even damage the rights and interests of network users.Internet platforms have the characteristics of two-sided markets,network effects,and lock-in effects that are different from traditional one-sided markets.These particularities affect the Self-Preferences implemented by platforms,which makes the traditional antitrust law regulation approach face many difficulties.Therefore,it has important theoretical and practical significance to explore the antitrust regulation of platforms’ self-Preference behavior.Starting from the analysis of the common characteristics of the Internet platform,based on the dual identities of the Internet platform,this paper discusses the new characteristics of the Self-Preference that is different from the Self-Preference of traditional industries,and then through distinguishing the Self-Preference.The positive and anti-competitive effects on the market demonstrate the necessity of regulation.The positive impact of Self-Preference is that platform operators can obtain more benefits through Self-Preference,save management costs and force innovation on the platform;the negative impact is that this behavior will damage the fair competition interests of operators on the platform and affect the full play of the market competition mechanism,and eventually detract from the welfare of consumers.When referring to foreign law enforcement cases to regulate self-preferential behavior along the path of abusing market dominance,the behaviors listed in my country’s existing antitrust laws can basically cover the specific forms of self-preferential behavior,but the characteristics of the Internet platform lead to some problems in the specific identification process.dilemma.First,in terms of determining the dominant position,the market share method in the market structure standard is difficult to apply to Internet platform companies,and it is also difficult to justify the "essential facilities" of Internet platforms;The management behavior provides him with a strong defense;the third is to use the cover clause to deal with the unlisted behavior without clear guidance.In order to resolve the regulatory dilemma of the antitrust law,the author believes that we can start from the three paths of improving the identification of dominant position,establishing the obligation of platform neutrality,and alternatively applying necessary facilities.Improving the determination of dominance status is the perfection of traditional post-event remedies,and establishing neutral obligations for platforms,or even pre-identifying a certain level of platforms as certain "essential facilities" is a supplement to ex-ante regulatory measures.