Research On The Regulatory Path Of Workers’ Voluntary Waiver Of Social Insurance Contributions

This “short-sighted” behavior not only ultimately infringes on workers’ constitutional right to material assistance,but also jeopardises the sustainable operation of China’s social security system.However,the current law does not expressly provide for this phenomenon,and the discretion of local courts and labour arbitration bodies has led to different criteria for judging this phenomenon,resulting in differing judgments and arbitration outcomes.In order to have a uniform standard within their jurisdictions,local systems with local characteristics have been introduced to regulate this phenomenon,but this has objectively solidified and exacerbated the phenomenon of "different judgments in the same case".Therefore,in order to maintain the authority of judicial decisions,it is necessary to examine the ways of regulating the behavior of workers who voluntarily abandon the payment of social insurance contributions.With the aim of promoting the sustainable development of China’s social insurance system,an empirical analysis based on cases shows that the reasons for the inconsistent judicial decisions on workers’ voluntary waiver of social insurance contributions include two aspects: firstly,the bias in the interpretation of the text of the relevant system by the judiciary,i.e.the lack of clarity in the existing law on social insurance disputes,which has led to the bias in the understanding of the courts and arbitration bodies in terms of the scope of cases and the applicable law;secondly,the bias in the setting of liability driven by the legislative policy,i.e.the legislator’s unilateral liability for both workers and employers’ violation of the mandatory obligation to pay social insurance contributions.The second is the bias in the setting of liability driven by legislative policy,i.e.the unilateral liability set by the legislator for the breach of the mandatory obligation to pay social security contributions by both the worker and the employer,which to a certain extent contributes to the lack of clarity in the voluntary non-payment of social security contributions by the worker.In this regard,on the basis of the different judicial decisions and arbitration practices in different parts of the country and the model of regulation of contributions to the universal health insurance system in Taiwan,the following regulatory path has been created: from the perspective of judicial regulation,on the one hand,the “federalism” of the social insurance system has been diluted and the “same judgment” has been achieved as far as possible.On the other hand,the principle of “honesty” in the core socialist values is integrated with judicial decisions;on the political regulatory path,the existing administrative regulatory texts are sorted out to reconstruct the distribution of responsibilities of social insurance contributors in China’s social insurance system,and through the dual power The interaction between the two powers provides a powerful means of regulating the phenomenon of voluntary abandonment of social security contributions.