| When the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan collapsed in mid-August 2021,the United States faced a new diplomatic dilemma.On one hand,there was the option to cooperate with the new leadership in Afghanistan,maintaining a level of engagement far below formal recognition and exploring opportunities for cooperation.On the other hand,there was an attempt to exert economic and political pressure to undermine Taliban control over Afghanistan.Following the Taliban’s return to power,the Biden administration largely pursued a middle path between these two options.While U.S.officials engaged in dialogues with the Taliban since the summer of 2021 and remained open to the prospects of commercial relationships,the White House also sought to leverage financial tools to compel the Taliban regime to change its behavior.Washington insisted that the Taliban must establish an inclusive government,allow equal access to education for women and girls,cease suppressing former opponents of the Afghan government,and reduce human rights violations.This article primarily focuses on the study of U.S.policy toward the Taliban,starting with an analysis of Afghanistan’s history and geopolitical environment.It then describes the Taliban’s developments within Afghanistan,analyzes the evolution of U.S.and NATO policies towards the Taliban,and finally focuses on the failures and reasons behind the U.S.and NATO’s policy towards the Taliban.Ultimately,it explores how the United States and NATO did not achieve their strategic objectives in Afghanistan. |