Research On Decision-making Of Power Battery Closed-loop Supply Chain From The Perspective Of Manufacturer Overconfidence

In recent years,the unremitting innovation of power battery technology has promoted the development of new energy vehicle industry to a certain extent,and also brought the"retirement"boom of power battery.According to the particularity of power batteries,the state encourages cascade users to properly recycle and process retired batteries and make full use of them.At the same time,for the closed loop of power battery recycling,industrial alliances are formed among manufacturers and recycling firms,and decision-making is more centralized.Based on the above background,this thesis brings the power battery innovation input into the decision-making of the power battery closed-loop supply chain,with the manufacturer as the leading role and the cascade user following,and studies the influence of the manufacturer’s overconfidence on the decision-making of the power battery closed-loop supply chain under different circumstances.Firstly,the closed-loop supply chain model of power battery without considering overconfidence was constructed.,as the benchmark model(case ON).By the method of dynamic game,get the equilibrium under centralized,decentralized decision making decisions,the results show that before the manufacturer to the pilot use repurchase used batteries,pilot units retired batteries to make use of business arrangement in the use benefit is greater than recycling cost;Under centralized decision,the manufacturer’s innovation investment decision and the total profit of closed-loop supply chain are greater than those under decentralized decision.When the innovation effect is low,the selling price under centralized decision is lower than that under decentralized decision,and the recovery rate is higher than that under decentralized decision,and vice versa.The innovation effect threshold is 1.Secondly,ON the basis of the case ON decentralized decision making,consider maker overconfidence behavior of three kinds of performance:the repurchase price overconfidence(case OB),to the retail price of overconfidence(case OP),the innovation effect of overconfidence(case OI),decision-making with three kinds of situations equilibrium profit,and comparing with situation ON,the results showed that:The buyback price decision is not affected by the manufacturer’s overconfidence behavior.The manufacturer will increase the power battery innovation input under both OB and OP,but will decrease the innovation input under OI.Step utilizers can improve recovery rate under OB and OP,but reduce recovery rate under OI.The retail price in case OI is higher than that in case ON,while in case OB and OP,the innovation effect is lower than a certain threshold,then the retail price decision is lower than that in case ON,and vice versa.Manufacturers’over-confidence in price is not conducive to the increase of their own profits,but can increase the profits of cascade users and the total profits of the battery closed-loop supply chain.Manufacturers’over-confidence in the innovation effect is not conducive to the profit increase of themselves,cascade users and power battery closed-loop supply chain.Finally,based on the background of two enterprises,BYD and GEM,the analytical results and propositions are verified by simulation.The results show that the technological innovation of power battery is conducive to the development of the power battery industry of new energy vehicles.When the innovation effect is at a low level,the improvement of innovation input level and recovery rate brings more profit increase to the step users than to the manufacturers,and vice versa when the innovation effect is high,there is a threshold of innovation effect~*.There are 30 figures,10 tables and 78 references in this thesis.