The Impact Of Outside Director Capital On Enterprise Investment Efficiency

In order to improve and optimize the corporate governance of state-owned enterprise groups,and promote the improvement of investment efficiency of state-owned enterprises.In2004,the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council introduced the outside director system for the first time in state-owned enterprise groups.After more than ten years of board reform,by the end of 2020,most central enterprises and local stateowned enterprises have established boards of directors with standardized forms and complete systems.Outside directors who join the board of directors of state-owned enterprise groups can put forward constructive opinions in the board of directors of the groups with their own rich capital advantages,and use their own rich capital advantages to strictly control when making major investment decisions of state-owned enterprises,so as to prevent insider control and loss of state-owned assets.At the same time,the general office of the State Council issued a document to promote the organic unity and integration of the governance of the party organization and the board of directors.Embedding party organizations into corporate governance and strengthening their main responsibility position in state-owned enterprises is conducive to improving investment efficiency.This thesis studies the impact of outside director capital on investment efficiency,and tests the moderating role of party organization governance.Based on China’s institutional background,this thesis uses the methods of literature analysis,factor analysis and multiple regression analysis to study the impact of outside director capital on enterprise investment efficiency.By combing the literature on outside director capital,party organization governance and investment efficiency,this thesis demonstrates and puts forward research hypotheses based on resource dependence theory,high-level echelon theory,housekeeper theory and modern investment theory.In the empirical research part,the thesis manually collects the data of central enterprises,local state-owned enterprise groups and their listed subsidiaries from 2016 to 2020,uses Excel and Stata software to process the data,and uses multiple regression analysis to study the relationship between outside director capital and enterprise investment efficiency,as well as the moderating role of party organization governance.The results show that:(1)there is a significant positive correlation between outside director capital and enterprise investment efficiency.The abundance of outside director capital is conducive to the improvement of enterprise investment efficiency.(2)Based on the moderating effect model,the moderating effect of party organization governance is identified.That is,party organization governance has a positive moderating effect on outside director capital and enterprise investment efficiency.(3)The positive moderating effect of the party organization governance of central enterprises on the capital and investment efficiency of outside directors is stronger than that of local state-owned enterprises.The thesis makes robustness analysis by intercepting 90% quantile interval regression and replacing investment efficiency variables,and the research conclusion has not changed.In the part of endogenous analysis,first select the instrumental variables and test their effectiveness,then conduct the Hausman test,and finally conduct the analysis through the two-stage least square method,it is found that after controlling the endogenous,the conclusion is consistent with the previous text.In view of the above conclusions,the thesis puts forward some suggestions to improve the effectiveness of the outside director system,including establishing an excellent talent database;Expand the scale of outside directors and enrich the capital of outside directors;Promote the combination of Party organizational governance and corporate governance,and earnestly strengthen the main responsibility;Improve the data transparency of state-owned enterprise groups.