The allocation of controlling shares is an important part of the corporate governance structure of mixed ownership enterprises,especially the most typical jointstock listed companies.This paper studies the rationalization of controlling rights allocation of state-owned listed companies from the perspective of capital ownership concentration.Controlling right is an important part of property right or generalized ownership.Therefore,the analysis of controlling right must start from property right and its relationship with ownership.Modern western scholars have done a lot of valuable research on property rights and corporate control,which is worth learning from.However,their research usually has the color of utilitarian liberalism and idealism,and there are inevitably major defects in the research on related issues.Based on this,we should learn from the essence of Marxist classical writers’ Thoughts on the allocation of controlling shares,and integrate and expand the allocation of controlling shares to provide appropriate theoretical guidance for the study of practical problems.At present,state-owned listed companies have become the backbone of stateowned economic development,playing an important role in optimizing the layout of state-owned capital and guiding the optimal allocation of social resources.After years of reform,a considerable number of state-owned enterprises have been restructured into joint-stock companies and become listed companies.The split share structure reform of Listed Companies in 2005-2007 pushed the allocation of controlling rights of stateowned listed companies to the focus of state-owned enterprise reform.In particular,after the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China proposed to vigorously develop the mixed ownership economy,the State Council issued the opinions on the development of mixed ownership economy by stateowned enterprises.The allocation of controlling rights of state-owned listed companies has become the concern of deepening the reform of state-owned enterprises.Although the allocation of controlling rights of state-owned listed companies continues to improve in the direction of rationalization,the level of governance needs to be further improved.At present,the current situation of equity allocation in China’s state-owned listed companies has led to a series of problems,such as insider control,poor equity checks and balances,and super control by major shareholders.Therefore,we should focus on the enterprises’ pursuit of profit maximization,the control and competitiveness of state-owned capital,and seek the further improvement of the equity allocation of state-owned listed companies in practice.This paper selects the data of 952 state-owned listed companies in 2020 for research,takes the enterprise performance as the explanatory variable,takes the holding proportion of the largest shareholder as the explanatory variable,and takes the capital structure,growth and enterprise scale as the control variables.Through analysis,it is found that there is a significant positive correlation between the holding proportion of the largest shareholder of 20%-30% and the company performance,and through analysis and judgment,Obtain a more reasonable proportion range for the allocation of foreign controlled shares.Finally,in view of the problems in the allocation of controlling shares of state-owned listed companies and the value orientation of enhancing the efficiency and competitiveness of enterprises,this paper puts forward the following countermeasures and suggestions: first,under the principle that state-owned capital has control power,the arrangement of state-owned capital control of stateowned listed companies mainly implements relative control;Second,according to the industry,status and category of the enterprise,implement the relative holding of capital with an appropriate shareholding ratio;Third,establish and improve the equity balance mechanism of state-owned listed companies;Fourth,improve the equity allocation of state-owned listed companies through the employee stock ownership incentive plan. |