Multiple Large Shareholders And Asset Mispricing

In recent years,the stock market price fluctuates frequently and greatly,resulting in a serious deviation between its own price and the actual value of assets.In a market where corporate information cannot be timely and efficiently transmitted to stakeholders,the controlling shareholder of an enterprise will,driven by the principalagent problem,"take advantage" of this defect,carry out speculative arbitrage activities and obtain excess returns.This pricing anomaly continues to worsen.The emergence of the ownership structure with multiple large shareholders coexists has changed the previous governance pattern of single controlling shareholder.However,existing studies have not yet reached an exact conclusion on the role it can play.Some scholars believe that the emergence of multiple large shareholders strengthens the supervision of controlling shareholders and effectively alleviates the degree of information asymmetry between enterprises and external investors.From the perspective of"collusion effect" and "coordination cost",the opposing voices draw different conclusions to worsen the agency problem.Then,in the face of value deviation in the capital market,does the coexistence of multiple large shareholders improve the company’s pricing performance through mutual supervision and checks and balances among shareholders,or does it fall into the trap of"collusion" or the financial anomaly of adverse supervision to worsen it?This paper selects domestic and foreign literature on the coexistence of multiple large shareholders and asset mispricing,takes a series of theories as theoretical support,and selects Chinese A-share companies from 2007 to 2021 as research samples.The research conclusions are as follows:(1)The coexistence of multiple large shareholders will significantly worsen the asset mispricing situation of enterprises.The emergence of multiple large shareholders may lead to lower allocation of illegal costs,greater coordination costs,and greater power generated by collusion.That is to say,the coexistence of large shareholders will not only fail to effectively supervise,but will aggravate the principal-agent problem,worsen the degree of information asymmetry of enterprises,and aggravate the degree of deviation of asset value.(2)Coexistence of multiple large shareholders will aggravate overvaluation and weaken undervaluation.To keep their wealth stable,big shareholders would disclose carefully embellished corporate information to the market,driving up the company’s share price beyond its actual value.(3)Accounting information manipulation is a means of pricing bias caused by enterprises with multiple large shareholders.Companies with multiple large shareholders will convey the signal of good operation to the market through earnings management,and influence investors to make correct judgment on stock value by reducing accounting comparability.(4)Different internal and external factors will have different degrees of influence on this aggravating relationship.Equity pledge,share balances,analyst attention and market competition will affect the role of multiple large shareholders in asset pricing.This paper studies the influence of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on the degree of asset mispricing,makes clear the direction of mispricing,considers the action path and influence conditions comprehensively from the perspective of internal and external governance,and enriche the relevant literature on the coexistence of multiple large shareholders and enterprise asset mispricing.It has some enlightenment for the supervision department to strengthen the governance of information disclosure and external investors to use corporate information rationally.