| In emerging market countries such as China,most companies adopt a highly concentrated shareholding structure,and in addition to the shareholding structure controlled by a single large shareholder,the shareholding structure in which multiple large shareholders coexist is also widespread.When there are multiple large shareholders in the company,other large shareholders can supervise and restrain the controlling shareholder,the controlling shareholder has to pay attention to his own behavior,and the rights and interests of the small and medium shareholders of the company can be protected as well.Since corporate investment is the only source of corporate value creation,the purpose of coexisting multiple large shareholders is to introduce a supervisory mechanism,enhance the value creation capability of the company,and achieve high-quality development.Therefore,the influence of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on the company will firstly be reflected in its investment behavior,and then further affect the future development of the company.Therefore,what is the impact of the existence of multiple large shareholders in Chinese listed companies on their investments? If the coexistence of multiple large shareholders can have an impact on the inefficient investment behavior and real option investment behavior of the company,what impact will it ultimately have on the high-quality development of the company? What is its mechanism of action? These are all questions worthy of in-depth study and discussion.Currently,almost a quarter of the listed companies in China have multiple large shareholders.On the basis of principal-agent,resource dependence and stakeholder theory,this thesis uses business investment and high quality development as the research object to analyze the relevant data of China’s A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020.By using the fixed panel effect,Propensity Score Matching(PSM),Heckman Selection Model and other empirical methods,this thesis deeply analyzes the effect and mechanism of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on enterprise investment and highquality development through the combination of theory and empirical methods.The findings are as follows: Firstly,based on the perspective of short-term capital investment,the existence of multiple large shareholders is conducive to restraining the over-investment of enterprises,alleviating the under-investment of enterprises,and ultimately improving the investment efficiency of enterprises.Compared with the influence on the underinvestment,it can restrain the overinvestment more effectively.Furthermore,financing constraints play a partial moderating role in the path of inefficient investment by enterprises with multiple large shareholders.Secondly,based on the perspective of long-term real option investment,the existence of multiple large shareholders has an asymmetric impact on the investment decisions and option values of real enterprises.Among them,the coexistence of multiple large shareholders can effectively improve the value of corporate growth options,but has no significant effect on liquidation options.In addition,compared with a company governed by a single large shareholder,the coexistence of multiple large shareholders has a significant positive impact on the high-quality development of the enterprise.Furthermore,the coexistence of multiple large shareholders is beneficial to the high-quality development of enterprises,and the investment efficiency is an important intermediary path for the coexistence of multiple large shareholders to the high-quality development of enterprises.Based on the research conclusions,this thesis suggests that the listed companies should comprehensively consider the impact of different types of ownership structure on the company to build a reasonable ownership structure accordingly.Moreover,controlling shareholders should create convenient conditions for other large shareholders to stimulate their enthusiasm to join the decision-making process of the company’s management.Other large shareholders should work with controlling shareholders to make investment decisions jointly.Besides,companies shall improve the quality of capital market participants,enhance the transparency of information to guide large shareholders to regulate their behavior.At the level of regulatory authorities,not only should the relevant laws be continuously improved,but also the investors should be strengthened in the legal system.In addition,institutional policies such as mixed ownership reform and ShanghaiHong Kong Stock Connect will be further implemented to establish a sound system and create a good institutional environment for non-controlling shareholders to participate in the decision-making process of the companies.Moreover,a perfect system should be established to encourage non-controlling shareholders to participate in the decisionmaking process of enterprises,and strive to improve the governance mechanism of other large shareholders to the listed company,so as to effectively reduce the second type of agency problems of the companies.At the level of shareholders and investors,the quality of the participants in the capital market shall be improved,and the information transparency shall be strengthened to assist large shareholders to regulate their behaviors.On the other hand,more specified and more comprehensive investor protection mechanism shall be made to further improve the institutional system of the corporate shareholders in the governance of the whole management process.This study not only expands the direct influence of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders on listed companies from the perspective of corporate investment,but also enrichis the research on the microeconomic effect of the coexistence of multiple large shareholders in listed companies from the perspective of high-quality development of enterprises.It also provides theoretical reference and policy suggestions for listed companies on how to reduce inefficient investment,enhance the value of growth options,promote high-quality development of enterprises,and further play the positive role of multiple large shareholders. |