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The Mechanism And Empirical Analysis Of The Impact Of Non-state-owned Shareholders’ Participation In Governance On The Preservation And Appreciation Of State-owned Enterprises’ Assets

Posted on:2024-06-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y DaiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2569307052971819Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets is the primary responsibility and important goal of commercial state-owned enterprise,which is placed in the position of value evaluation criteria in the documents and policies of state-owned enterprise reform and is closely related to the function of state-owned economy.As a key element of state-owned enterprise reform,mixed ownership reform has attracted many commercial state-owned enterprises.For these enterprises,achieving preservation and appreciation of state-owned assets should be premised on the preservation and appreciation of all assets of the enterprise,and therefore the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises’ assets is a reasonable choice to measure the effectiveness of mixed reform.The participation of non-state shareholders in governance,as a product of the in-depth implementation of the mixed reform,requires that they not only hold part of the equity of state-owned enterprises,but also be able to appoint personnel to the board of directors to achieve more in-depth and substantive participation.So,whether the participation of non-state shareholders in governance will help to promote the maintenance and appreciation of state-owned enterprises is of great significance for judging the effectiveness of state-owned enterprise reform.In addition,it is not enough to focus only on whether the objectives are achieved or not,but more critically,how the participation of non-state shareholders in governance has achieved value preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises’ assets,which is an important guideline for state-owned enterprises undergoing mixed reform,but the existing literature is scarce and needs to be explored and tested using empirical methods.Therefore,this paper,on the basis of literature combing and theoretical padding,uses commercial state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from2013-2021 as the research sample,and empirically tests the impact of non-state shareholders’ participation in governance on state-owned enterprises’ asset preservation and appreciation and the specific mechanism of the effect therein by constructing a multivariate linear regression model,and the research results show that:(1)the deeper the participation of non-state shareholders in governance,the more it can promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises’ assets,and such participation cannot be achieved only by holding part of the equity,but needs to empower non-state shareholders to appoint directors;(2)the participation of non-state shareholders in governance can strengthen the executive incentive,which in turn can promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises’ assets;(3)the participation of non-state shareholders in governance can improve the quality of information disclosure,which in turn can promote the preservation and appreciation of state-owned enterprises’ assets;(4)the promotion effect of non-state shareholders’ participation in governance on state-owned enterprises’ asset preservation and appreciation is more obvious when the institutional environment is excellent and the quality of external audit is high.The innovations of this paper include:(1)exploring the mechanism based on the characteristics of asset preservation and appreciation,and using the empirical method to examine the mediating role played by executive incentives and information disclosure quality,so as to provide a reference for the sound operation mechanism of state-owned enterprises in mixed reform;(2)further exploring the economic consequences of "changing the mechanism" of governance by non-state shareholders,and demonstrating that the effectiveness of introducing non-public capital to help state-owned enterprises improve their mechanism,so as to provide ideas for improving quality and efficiency of mixed state-owned enterprises.
Keywords/Search Tags:Non-state-owned Shareholders’ Participation in Governance, Executive Incentive, Quality of Information Disclosure, Preservation and Appreciation of State-owned Enterprises’ Assets
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