Research On Profit Expropriation Of Controlling Shareholders Of S Company Under The Background Of Mixed Ownership Reform

In recent years,problems such as low operating efficiency and rigid management system of state-owned enterprises have become prominent,and the government has begun to advocate mixed ownership reform to improve the operation of state-owned enterprises.In this context,state-owned enterprises introduce capital of different nature to reform and form a new ownership structure,which leads to new principal-agent problems,and then induces the controlling shareholder’s interest embezzlement behavior,which greatly hinders the reform process of state-owned enterprises,aggravates the enterprise management crisis,and slows down the development of the capital market.Therefore,in order to maintain the effect of mixed ownership reform,it is very necessary to study the benefit encroachment of state-owned enterprises after the mixed ownership reform.As the research object of this paper,after the mixed ownership reform of Company S,the controlling shareholder was changed from the government to the introduced strategic investor.After the mixed ownership reform,the controlling shareholder encroachment on the interests of Company S,resulting in the impact of the reform effect of Company S.By studying the motives,methods,consequences and causes of interest embezzlement of controlling shareholders under the background of mixed ownership reform,this paper adds new cases for the development of mixed ownership reform in China and also brings new enlightenment for the prevention of interest embezzlement of other mixed ownership reform enterprises.Based on the theory of private gain of control rights,information asymmetry theory,property right theory and principal-agent theory,this paper deeply analyzes the consequences and causes of the interest embezzlement event of S Company.Specifically,in order to alleviate their own financial pressure,the controlling shareholder of S Company appropriated4.046 billion yuan of S Company from 2018 to 2020 through illegal borrowing and borrowing of company funds and occupying funds of jointly owned subsidiaries,and still had 475 million yuan of funds not returned when the benefit embezzlement incident was disclosed.The benefit embezzlement incident has brought a series of adverse consequences to the company.This paper uses Z-score model,event research method and Tobin’s Q value for analysis,and the conclusion shows that the benefit embezzlement incident has increased the financial risk of S Company,damaged the interests of minority shareholders and the value of the company,and caused a series of crises to S Company.In addition,the analysis of the whole process of S Company’s mixed ownership reform shows that there are three main reasons for the implementation of the controlling shareholder’s benefit embezzlement.First,the preparatory work in the early stage of the mixed ownership reform is insufficient,and S Company’s understanding of the actual situation of the controlling shareholder is limited;Second,there are defects in the internal governance of S Company after the completion of the mixed ownership reform,which gives the controlling shareholder an opportunity to take advantage of;Third,the external supervision mechanism is not sound,can not implement effective constraints on the controlling shareholders.Through the analysis and study of the case companies,this paper concludes that the reform plan formulated before the mixed-ownership reform of S company was deficient,failing to identify the debt pressure of strategic investors.After the completion of the mixed-ownership reform,the defects of the company’s internal governance and external supervision mechanism led to the interest embezzlement of the controlling shareholders,which eventually led to a series of adverse consequences.Finally,based on the causes of the encroachment of the controlling shareholders of S Company,this paper further puts forward enlightenment and suggestions for the mixed-ownership reform enterprises and relevant regulatory agencies: Before the mixed-ownership reform,enterprises should conduct due diligence on the strategic investors to be introduced,and make a complete mixed-ownership reform plan to lay a solid foundation for the mixed-ownership reform.After the completion of the mixed ownership reform,the internal governance system should be improved,and internal risks should be identified and prevented in a timely manner to improve the efficiency of operation and management.External regulatory bodies should also strengthen the punishment of benefit encroachment,improve the market supervision mechanism,and implement effective constraints on market entities.Hope to provide reference for the mixed reform enterprises.