Research On The Impact Of Non-state-owned Shareholder Governance On Risk-taking Of State-owned Enterprises Under The Background Of Mixed Reform

As the pillar of our national economy,state-owned enterprises not only enjoy the support of national policies,but also undertake a lot of policy burdens in the process of promoting economic development.There are problems of owner absence and insider control that lead to the conservative investment of state-owned enterprises,which is manifested as insufficient risk bearing of state-owned enterprises.With the continuous deepening of the reform of state-owned enterprises,the introduction of non-state capital into state-owned enterprises is an effective approach to mixed ownership reform.Existing studies have found that the governance of non-state shareholders can supervise and restrict the self-interested behaviors of management and controlling shareholders.Therefore,under the background of the mixed reform,the in-depth study of the non-state-owned shareholders in equity governance and high-level governance on corporate risk-taking has enlightenment significance for the promotion of state-owned enterprises in our country.This article analyzes the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory,property rights theory,and resource based theory.Based on theoretical research,three hypotheses are proposed to empirically analyze the relationship between non-state shareholder governance and state-owned enterprise risk taking.This paper takes the A-share state-owned holding listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2011 to2019 as research samples,measures the governance of non-state-owned shareholders from two perspectives of equity governance and high-level governance,and adopts the regression model to study the governance of non-state-owned shareholders.As a moderating variable,the interaction term between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and the quality of internal control is generated,which is added to the regression model for regression analysis,to study whether the quality of internal control will have an impact on the relationship between the two,and to explore the role of the enterprise’s internal regulatory environment.This paper further analyzes the influence of non-state-owned shareholders’ governance on corporate financing and investment,explores specific ways to promote corporate risk taking,and tests whether the governance role of non-state-owned shareholders is different at different levels of state-owned enterprises by grouping.This paper combines empirical and theoretical research to draw conclusions:(1)Equity governance of non-state-owned shareholders is positively correlated with risk taking of state-owned enterprises;There is a positive correlation between senior governance of non-state-owned shareholders and risk taking of state-owned enterprises.(2)The high level of internal control quality can significantly enhance the positive correlation between the governance of non-state-owned shareholders and the risk taking of state-owned enterprises to a certain extent.(3)The governance of non-state-owned shareholders mainly improves the risk taking of state-owned enterprises through investment channels.(4)Compared with central enterprises,non-state-owned shareholders’ governance plays a more significant role in promoting enterprise risk taking in local state-owned enterprises.Through research,this paper enriched the research results of state-owned enterprises’ mixed reform,enterprise risk taking,internal control quality and so on,which is helpful for state-owned enterprises to improve the supervision mechanism,pay attention to the construction of internal control,escort the governance role of non-state-owned shareholders,enhance the competitive advantage and enterprise vitality,and achieve sustainable development.