Research On Institutional Investors’ Shareholding And Majorshareholders’ Tunneling Behavior

In the A-share market,not all institutional investors have a positive impact on the governance of listed companies.There are still some institutional investors who have no impact on the governance of listed companies,even negative impact.This part of institutional investors lack effective supervision over the damage of major shareholders to the rights and interests of listed companies and other small and medium-sized shareholders,which ultimately leads to the impairment of the market value of listed companies.This paper mainly studies the impact of such institutional investors on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders.This paper has studied the relevant literature on the tunneling of major shareholders and the shareholding of institutional investors,and found that there are a large number of literature on the behavior of tunneling of major shareholders in the academic community.The large sample empirical analysis and case study have been very mature.Therefore,this paper also fully uses these research methods for reference in the case analysis of tunneling of major shareholders of HNA Technology.For the other,dispite the traditionnal role of institutional investors in the tunneling of major shareholders,the current domestic literature mainly focuses on the positive impact of institutional investors on corporate governance,while the literature on the research of no impact or negative impact is relatively small.This paper analyzes the capital occupation,related party transactions,related party guarantees and other tunneling methods of the major shareholder HNA Group from 2014 to 2021,and statistics and describes the reaction of institutional investors represented by Guohua Life.This paper analyzes the tunneling motivation of major shareholders from three aspects: equity pledge,capital demand and debt crisis.This paper describes and summarizes the participation of institutional investors such as Guohua Life in corporate governance by selecting events such as management incentives,equity participation in Sinochem Guarantee,merger and acquisition of Yingmai International,and sale of Yingmai International.Finally,it analyzes the impact of institutional investors’ shareholding on HNA’s financial performance,such as profitability,operation and solvency.Through the case analysis of HNA Technology,we can learn that the more complex the shareholding structure of major shareholders and the larger the group,the easier it is to empty the listed companies;When major shareholders have equity pledge,cash flow tension,debt crisis and other situations,the hollowing of listed companies controlled by them usually becomes the target of hollowing;When institutional investors participate in listed companies,it is difficult for different institutional investors to form a joint force,and the size of their joint shareholding ratio has no impact on the tunneling behavior of major shareholders;Institutional investors’ equity participation has no obvious effect on the improvement of financial performance of listed companies,and may even have a negative impact on asset-liability ratio.Based on the research results,this paper puts forward the following suggestions: First,establish a joint mechanism between institutional investors at the national level;Second,institutional investors should change the traditional idea of voting at meetings and actively participate in corporate governance by actively submitting shareholder proposals.Through case analysis,this paper finds that institutional investors represented by Guohua Life have hitchhikes and neglect of supervision in the case of HNA Technology.Through the analysis of such institutional investors,it can provide some inspiration for external regulators and other investors from the negative side,and provide case support for this type of research...