Research On The Equity Pledge And The Risk Of Control Transfer Of M Company

In 2013,the scale of equity pledge business of pledge postponement in the open market showed explosive growth,and the pledge behavior of shareholders gradually developed from "pledge on demand" to "full warehouse pledge".Under the high proportion of equity pledge,shareholders frequently encroached on the interests of the company,affecting the sustainable operation and stock price stability of the company.The new regulations on equity pledge issued in 2018 further restricted the behavior of equity pledge,but the continuous decline of stock price triggered compulsory liquidation,which led to frequent problems of control transfer,which seriously affected the operating stability of listed companies.Based on the private control theory,information asymmetry theory and signal transmission theory,this paper selects M company as a case company,takes the equity pledge behavior of its actual controller Lin and the controlling shareholder r company as the research object,analyzes the formation process and causes of the control transfer risk of the company under the equity pledge,and provides suggestions for listed companies to avoid the control transfer risk under the equity pledge.The analysis results of this paper show that the separation of the two rights under equity pledge will aggravate the motivation and behavior of major shareholders’ interest occupation,aggravate the company’s financial crisis and lead to the continuous decline of the company’s stock price;The high proportion of equity pledge will aggravate the fluctuation of the company’s stock price,and then increase the default risk and compulsory liquidation risk of equity pledge;The major shareholders were unable to cope with the crisis of forced liquidation and were forced to reduce their shares in large quantities,while the third party bought a large number of shares of the company at a lower cost,which eventually led to the risk of control transfer.This paper holds that optimizing the internal governance system and increasing the cost of interest embezzlement can effectively prevent the interest embezzlement of major shareholders under equity pledge;Taking individual shareholders as the subject of pledge proportion and limiting the voting rights corresponding to pledged shares are conducive to the improvement of equity pledge management mechanism;The prevention of closing risk can be carried out from the perspectives of paying attention to the profitability of main business and market value management;The expansion of the scope of equity pledge information disclosure and the improvement of the timeliness of interest embezzlement disclosure are conducive to the improvement of the information disclosure mechanism.This paper hopes that through the above research,the company will pay attention to the high proportion of equity pledge of major shareholders,and help the company prevent the risk of control transfer under equity pledge.