Technology Licensing Strategy And Welfare Analysis Of Non Productive Enterprises Under Mixed Oligopoly Structure

Technology determines the future and is the cornerstone of the development of an enterprise and even a country.A new round of industrial reform has set off another climax of global scientific and technological innovation.The competition among enterprises has gradually developed into technology competition.Mastering technology is equivalent to mastering the initiative in the competition.However,due to the influence of R&D cycle,its own scale,input-output ratio and other factors,many enterprises can only obtain from other enterprises or R&D institutions specializing in technology R&D,that is,the so-called technology authorization.The study of economic problems under mixed oligarchs is an important tool to study the competitive market pattern and analyze the government’s decision-making behavior.At present,the research on technology licensing mainly focuses on the fully privatized market structure.Although there are a small number of technology licensing under the coexistence of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises,they are all studied from the perspective of productive enterprises.In this context,this paper constructs a model to study the optimal technology licensing strategy of a nonproductive technology owning enterprise and its impact on social welfare in the market structure of the coexistence of state-owned enterprises and private enterprises.Among them,when making decisions,state-owned enterprises not only consider enterprise profits,but also consider the overall social welfare.From the two perspectives of technology authorization to reduce production costs and improve product quality,this paper studies the choice of the optimal authorization object and charging method,as well as the resulting welfare impact,which is the biggest innovation of this paper.It is found that under the technology authorization to reduce production costs,when nonproductive enterprises adopt fixed charges,they will choose to authorize state-owned enterprises alone or two enterprises at the same time;When the franchise charges,choose to authorize at the same time;When double charging,it will be authorized to state-owned enterprises separately and at the same time.Between different charging methods,enterprises will choose to adopt the method of double charging.No matter who is authorized,it will improve the production efficiency in the market and improve the level of social welfare.Under the technology authorization to improve product quality,different from the above,when double charging is adopted,the technology owner will choose between authorizing to private enterprises and authorizing at the same time.Among them,when authorizing at the same time,it may also reduce the level of social welfare.The reason is that when the original quality level is high,the occurrence of technology authorization improves the product quality,enterprises raise the price,and the utility improvement brought by the improvement of quality to consumers is less than the utility loss brought by the increase of price to consumers,so as to reduce the consumer surplus;The profit increase brought by technology licensing is less than the decrease of consumer surplus,which eventually leads to the decrease of total social welfare,which is in contrast to our fixed thinking that improving product quality will improve social welfare.This paper collates the results and analyzes the conclusions.It is found that the dissemination of technology,improving production efficiency,reducing enterprise R & D expenses,promoting industrial transformation and upgrading are conducive to the increase of social welfare,but there are also exceptions.The situation of the decrease of social welfare is found and the reasons are explained,It provides reference for policy makers to formulate relevant policies on technology licensing under the mixed oligopoly market structure and maintain the level of social welfare.